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A skepticAl respOnse tO the JudiciAl sAlAry debAte
Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner1
AbstrAct
The public debate over the need to raise judicial salaries has been one-sided. Sen-
timent appears to be that judges are underpaid. But neither theory nor evidence 
provides much support for this view. The primary argument being made in favor 
of a pay increase is that it will raise the quality of judging. Theory suggests that 
increasing judicial salaries will improve judicial performance only if judges can be 
sanctioned for performing inadequately or if the appointments process reliably 
screens out low-ability candidates. However, federal judges and many state judges 
cannot be sanctioned, and the reliability of screening processes is open to ques-
tion. An empirical study of the high court judges of the fifty states provides little 
evidence that raising salaries would improve judicial performance.
1. the sAlAry debAte 
Chief Justice John Roberts says that the pay increases that his colleagues 
have received over the past two decades are so inadequate as to create a 
“constitutional crisis” (Year-End Report 2007). Justice Kennedy says that 
“[because of inadequate judicial pay] the nation is in danger of having a 
judiciary that is no longer considered one of the leading judiciaries of the 
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world” (Hearing 2007a). Justice Alito warns that “eroding judicial salaries 
will lead, sooner or later, to less capable judges and ultimately to inferior 
adjudication” (Hearing 2007b). Justice Breyer “believe[s] that something 
has seriously gone wrong with the judicial compensation system” (Hearing 
2007a). Lower court judges, lawyers, public intellectuals, and law professors 
agree (Parker 2007). One hundred and thirty law school deans signed a 
letter urging judicial pay increases (Letter 2007). The American College of 
Trial Lawyers endorses a salary increase (American College of Trial Lawyers 
2007). So does Paul Volker, the former Federal Reserve Board Chairman 
(Volker 2007). The complaints are not new—Chief Justice Rehnquist made 
them as did his predecessor, Chief Justice Burger (Frank 2003; Holt 2006). 
And they are not limited to federal judges. State judges and their support-
ers have been complaining equally loudly about inadequate pay (Schotland 
2007; Sherwin 2007; Wise 2008). Judith Kaye, the Chief Judge of the highest 
court in New York, went so far as to file suit against the legislature and the 
governor, asserting that the legislature’s and governor’s refusal to provide 
adequate salary increases for judges was undermining judicial indepen-
dence and effectiveness (Stashenko & Wise 2008). 
 Are these complaints plausible? How does one tell whether someone—a 
judge, or someone else—is underpaid? The judges cite data showing that they 
are paid less than (some) foreign judges and (some) practicing lawyers in the 
United States and some law professors, but why are these people the relevant 
comparison? What if these people are overpaid? To evaluate the argument 
that judges are underpaid, one needs a theory of wage compensation and 
empirical evidence. However, so far neither theory nor evidence has played a 
large role in the public debates. The purpose of this article is to generate a de-
bate over the proper theoretical and empirical foundations for determining 
the optimal level of judicial compensation. Setting out a simple theoretical 
model of judicial behavior, we demonstrate that the case for increasing the 
salaries of federal judges is weaker than recognized. However, the case may be 
stronger for state judges subject to a meaningful risk of job loss.
 We make several points. First, judicial pay cannot be evaluated in isola-
tion. Pay is but one aspect of judicial compensation—which includes sta-
tus, tenure, pensions, and the satisfaction derived from doing justice, affect-
ing policy, and wielding power—and working conditions in general, which 
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for judges, are usually pleasant. Judges receive assistance from secretaries 
and clerks, and have control over their schedules and other aspects of their 
working conditions. These elements must be considered together when de-
termining optimal judicial compensation.
 Second, judicial pay should advance the interests of the public. Whereas 
the existing debate focuses on comparisons between the salaries of judges 
and other legal professionals such as lawyers and law professors, the rel-
evant question is not whether these salary differences are unfair. Compen-
sation should be designed so as to give judges incentives to perform their 
office diligently in the public interest and to attract qualified people to 
judgeships. When raising salary does not change, or worsens, incentives, it 
is inadvisable; when it attracts people to judgeships who are more produc-
tive in the private sector or improves the patronage opportunities of elected 
officials, it is also inadvisable.
 Third, whether salary increases improve the performance of judges, and 
the quality of the people who become judges, is an empirical question. 
Few empirical studies shed light on these questions. The relevant studies 
look exclusively at federal judges who are paid the same, and operate under 
nearly identical conditions, making it difficult to evaluate the impact of dif-
fering conditions on performance.2 A literature on public sector employees 
exists, but provides few clues (Burgess & Ratto 2003). The literature on the 
effects of pay increases on public sector performance focuses on the effects 
of performance incentives (for example, basing teacher salaries on student 
exam scores) (Burgess & Ratto 2003). No one, however, advocates making a 
judge’s wages turn on the quality or quantity of her judicial output, which 
2	 On	point	is	Baker	(2008).	Using	three	different	data	sets	of	federal	circuit	court	judges,	Baker	
estimates	whether	effort,	quality,	and	independence	are	a	function	of	salary	(he	finds	that	
they	are	not).	Because	the	salaries	of	federal	judges	at	the	same	level	are	virtually	identical	
and	because	Baker	had	only	 federal	 judges	 in	his	data	set,	he	had	 to	 innovate	 to	create	a	
salary	measure	with	variation.	Opportunity	costs	in	the	model	are	the	average	partner	sal-
ary	within	the	state	in	which	the	court	was	located.	A	problem	is	that	federal	circuit	court	
judges	are	an	elite	group	often	with	a	national	stature—suggesting	 that	 the	 loss	of	salary	
is	from	a	local	law	firm	might	not	be	a	good	measure	of	opportunity	costs.	Baker,	however,	
looks	at	whether	judicial	candidates	tend	to	have	lived	in	that	particular	state	for	at	least	ten	
years	prior	to	becoming	judges	and	finds	that	most	(255	out	of	260)	have,	suggesting	that	
his	opportunity	cost	measure	might	be	valid.	It	is	possible,	however,	that	problems	with	his	
opportunity	cost	measure	might	be	driving	the	non-results.	
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in any event would be constitutionally dubious (at least for federal judges) 
(Pfander 2008). 
 The key question is whether in settings where there is little room for in-
centive compensation based on judicial outputs, pay can nonetheless mo-
tivate better performance. The theoretical case that increased pay will im-
prove judicial performance is uncertain. As we explain in Part 2, because of 
selection and incentive effects, increasing pay might even reduce the quality 
of performance. 
 To address the deficiencies in the empirical literature on judicial incentives, 
we conduct an empirical test of the relationship between judicial performance 
and pay. For our study, we construct a unique dataset of the decisions of judges 
of the high courts for every state for the time period from 1998 to 2000. We 
examine how higher judicial salary and other variables affecting the work en-
vironment of judges are related to various measures of judicial performance 
including productivity, opinion quality, and independence.
 Part 2 sets out a model of judicial behavior that relates the effects of a sal-
ary increase to the behavior of sitting judges and the decisions of prospective 
judges to seek a judgeship or remain in their current non-judicial position. 
The model casts doubt on the claim that raising the salaries of judges will im-
prove judicial behavior and the quality of judges when judges are protected 
by life tenure, suggesting instead that salary increases can improve judicial 
performance only when judges face a serious risk of termination or other 
punishment if they perform inadequately. Part 3 describes our empirical in-
quiry; Part 4 describes the data; Part 5 reports results.
 The empirical results tell a complicated story. Judicial productivity—opin-
ion-writing—is consistent with our model. Salary does not increase produc-
tivity on average. And while judges who face a higher risk of termination 
(failure to be reelected or reappointed) are more productive than those who 
do not, we find judges with more secure positions write higher-quality opin-
ions, as measured by out-of-state citations. Finally, we find no relationship 
between salary and judicial independence, whether or not judges face a risk 
of termination. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our 
findings for the debate about salary increases for federal judges.
 An earlier draft of this paper prompted a negative response from judges 
and others in the public debate (e.g., Marek 2008). Although we acknowl-
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edge limitations with our methodology, we hope that, at a minimum, we 
provoke pay raise advocates to explain their theoretical assumptions and 
provide better empirical support for their arguments that the current levels 
of judicial pay are inadequate.
2. A MOdel Of JudiciAl behAviOr
An employer, faced with a request for salary increases, will ask whether the 
salary increase will result in improved performance by the employee, such 
that the productivity gains exceed the extra cost. If the answer is yes, the 
employer will ask whether a salary increase is the best method among avail-
able options of improving performance. The performance improvement 
could occur in one of two ways. The increased salary could give existing 
workers stronger incentives to exert higher levels of effort (the “incentive 
effect”). And it could improve the quality of the pool of workers who apply 
for the job (the “selection effect”). In the context of the judiciary, both the 
incentive and selection effects depend on how judges, current and prospec-
tive, react to the higher salary.
 The standard economic model of worker behavior has workers maxi-
mizing utility subject to constraints. Since individual utility functions vary 
widely, an assumption often made is that workers maximize wealth (or, 
simplifying within a job setting, wage income). The judicial utility func-
tion, however, is different (Posner 2003; Smyth 2004). Judges are not maxi-
mizing wage income because most, if not all, judges could earn significantly 
higher wages in the private sector. A feature of the judge utility function, 
therefore, is that this person cares about achieving other goals as well as 
making money. 
 What might those other goals be? The job of a judge provides a range 
of nonpecuniary benefits that few other jobs do. Judges have power — the 
ability to decide the fate of others and to affect public policy. Judges also 
enjoy a high status in society, interesting work, a large degree of autonomy, 
and control over their schedules. Various strands of the literature on judi-
cial behavior posit judges as being more or less motivated by combinations 
of the above factors. For our purposes, it suffices to assume that there is a 
variety of types of individuals who might find the job of judging attrac-
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tive, including ideologues with political agendas, leisure or status seekers, 
workaholics, and “good judges”—people who derive utility from serving 
justice. In all cases, nonpecuniary benefits, as well as monetary reward, play 
a role in their decision to become judges (Posner 2008; Stras 2006).3
2.1. incentive effects
A pay increase will improve a worker’s incentive to exert effort only if the 
worker can be punished for failing to exert effort. In the context of judging, 
the only realistic type of punishment is termination, but not all judges can 
be terminated. Hence we divide our discussion into two parts: the case of 
judges with life employment and the case of judges who have fixed terms 
at the end of which they must undergo reelection or reappointment if they 
wish to retain their position.
2.1.1. Life Employment
Life employment means a near zero risk of termination. Termination is 
theoretically possible, but will not occur unless there is extreme misbehav-
ior in the form of corruption or an utter failure to perform the job. Because 
the job of judging provides many nonpecuniary benefits, the types of in-
dividuals who will be attracted to the job will be a combination of those 
who love the job, want to serve the public, want to impose their policy 
preferences on others, want status, or seek leisure. For our purposes the 
question is whether any of these types of individuals might be induced to 
work harder by a salary increase. The answer is probably not. 
 Consider four types of judges for purposes of illustration: the workaholic, 
the good judge, the status seeker, and the leisure seeker. For all four types, 
higher salary is unlikely to improve incentives to work hard. The workaholic 
works because she finds the job intellectually interesting. Maybe she could 
work more efficiently with a bigger computer screen or better library facili-
ties. But, standing alone, a higher salary is not going to make her find the job 
more interesting. Next, take the good judge. She works because she wants to 
3	 In	informal	conversations	with	judges,	an	additional	nonpecuniary	benefit	from	judging	that	
came	up	was	client	avoidance.	Apparently,	some	judicial	candidates	see	the	judiciary	as	a	
route	to	escape	having	to	listen	to	instructions	from	clients,	especially	the	demanding	clients	
one	finds	in	private	practice.	
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serve the public and gains utility from doing a good job. She is already doing 
what she thinks serves the public best — so, paying her more is not going to 
make her work harder or better.4 A similar story applies to the status-seeking 
judge. She desires the job because judges have high status in society. A higher 
salary does not necessarily produce more status.5 But even if it does, unless 
the high salary can be taken away, the status seeking judge enjoys the higher 
status that comes with the greater salary even without changing her perfor-
mance level. (To be sure, if a status seeker obtains status from writing good 
opinions, then her incentives will be largely the same as those of the good 
judge.) Finally, take the leisure seeker. He has taken the job because it gives 
him time for leisure. Give the leisure seeker more money and his ability to 
consume leisure increases. That vacation in Paris becomes a possibility.6 Es-
sentially, with life employment, the effect of a salary increase is the same as a 
gift. Because the salary increase is not conditional on exerting greater effort, 
the rational judge—regardless of what she enjoys about the job—has no in-
centive to exert greater effort.7
 
2.1.2. Risk of Termination for Inadequate Performance
As noted above, increasing the salary of a judge can provide an incentive to 
increase effort as long as an important condition is met: the judge can lose 
4	 In	theory,	the	use	of	higher	salaries	to	induce	effort	might	even	worsen	matters,	by	producing	
a	“crowding	out”	effect,	where	the	use	of	monetary	rewards	works	at	cross	purposes	with	
non-monetary	or	intrinsic	motivations	(Grepperud	&	Pedersen	2001;	Frey	1997;	but	cf. Eisen-
berger	&	Cameron	1996).	
5	 Part	of	the	status	 inherent	 in	a	 judgeship	could	be	the	priesthood	characteristic	of	the	 job	
(low	pay,	public	service,	restrictions	on	contact	with	the	public,	etc.).	If	so,	raising	the	judicial	
salaries	to	a	level	where	candidates	are	making	only	a	minimal	financial	sacrifice	in	taking	the	
job	might	reduce	the	job’s	status	value.	
6	 In	economics,	this	is	described	as	the	backward	bending	portion	of	the	labor	supply	curve	
(Nicholson	1998,	676-677).
7	 It	is	possible	to	construct	a	story	of	how	an	increase	in	salary	could	motivate	judges	to	exert	
more	effort.	But	the	story	does	not	stand	on	a	strong	foundation.	For	example,	judges	might	
view	themselves	 in	a	 reciprocal	gift-giving	relationship	with	 the	state,	where	 the	state	(or	
society)	provides	the	employee	with	gifts	an	in	exchange	the	employee	gives	back	the	gift	
of	high	effort	(Akerlof	1983).	As	best	we	know,	no	one	has	suggested	that	judges	see	them-
selves	in	this	kind	of	reciprocal	gift	giving	relationship	with	the	state.	At	bottom,	in	the	life	
employment	context,	 there	seems	 little	 reason	 to	expect	 that	higher	salaries	will	 result	 in	
increased	production.	
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her job. The more the judge values the compensation package—salary as 
well as the various nonpecuniary benefits—the harder the judge will work 
in order to avoid losing this scarce job. This is the theory of “efficiency 
wages” (Akerlof & Yellen 1986; Shapiro & Stiglitz 1984).
 The fly in the ointment is that there has to be an effective monitoring 
mechanism for the “efficiency wage” dynamic to work. If an employer in-
creases the salary of an assembly line worker in order to induce greater effort, 
the employer must also be able to fire the worker if she does not increase 
her effort. Otherwise, the worker will pocket the money and continue at the 
same level of effort. Typically, because effort cannot be directly measured, 
employers use proxies—such as number of pieces assembled. If the worker 
falls below her quota, she is fired or penalized in some other way. If, however, 
the proxy is not sufficiently correlated with effort, this strategy will not work. 
Suppose that the worker is supposed to train new workers, but is paid entirely 
on the basis of number of pieces assembled. She will shirk on training in 
order to maximize pay, possibly making the employer worse off. This is the 
“multitasking” problem (Holmstrom & Milgrom 1991).
 Federal judges cannot be fired for failing to undertake sufficient effort, but 
many state judges can, at least in principle. Whether they can in practice de-
pends on whether the state can solve the multitasking problem. In the case of 
elected judges, the “employer” is the electorate. The electorate is a dispersed 
body with little ability or incentive to engage in detailed monitoring of its 
agents. So, the increased effort will likely be exerted in the directions that 
the electorate is able to observe and not as much in directions that are less 
observable. Judges will perform on aspects of the job that the electorate cares 
about and can observe and shirk on other aspects of the job. 
 In states where the employer’s power has been in effect delegated to 
agents — for example, the governor, the legislature, or the local bar associa-
tion — the dynamic will play out differently. The employee/judge still has 
an incentive to exert high effort because she has a job that she does not want 
to lose, especially if she receives a salary increase. But in this version of the 
model, the judge’s incentives to perform will focus on pleasing the agent, 
the immediately relevant decision-maker. The agent likely will have a great-
er ability to monitor the judge than the dispersed populace. But the agent 
might have a personal agenda. A higher salary will induce more effort, but 
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in the direction of the agent’s preferences. And if the populace is unable to 
monitor the agent well, judgeships can end up becoming favors that politi-
cians or bar associations grant in exchange for favors done for them by the 
judges. Whether higher salaries enhance judicial performance thus depends 
on the quality of the judicial retention system. Rather than improving the 
quality of the justice system, increasing salaries might encourage judges to 
decide cases in a manner that advances the interests of elected officials or 
leaders of the bar.
2.2. selection effects
The selection argument is the primary one that the judges themselves make 
in favor of salary increases. Here, the relevant issue is not life employment 
versus termination but the process for selecting or appointing judges, and 
we organize our discussion accordingly.
2.2.1. When the Appointments Process Is Crude
If salaries are increased, more people will be attracted to the job. The question 
here is whether the salary increase is attracting the right type of candidate. 
The employer wants primarily the good judges and maybe also the workahol-
ics — those who work hard because they enjoy the job or are motivated by 
public service. It would like to avoid the leisure seekers, the status seekers, and 
those who seek to bring policy into line with their political preferences. 
 Higher salaries will attract workaholics and good judges. They like more 
money and will be more likely to give up lucrative jobs elsewhere if the 
wages of being a judge are higher. The problem is that the leisure and sta-
tus seekers like higher salaries, too. Increasing salary, then, increases the 
attractiveness of judgeships both to people who would be good judges and 
to people who would be bad judges. Indeed, the argument might be made 
that a low salary will attract more workaholics and fewer leisure and status 
seekers than a higher salary because leisure seekers need money to be able 
to purchase leisure, and status seekers will get less status from a low-paid 
job. Those who are committed to advancing the public good, or who enjoy 
working for its own sake, by contrast, may still become judges despite a 
low salary (Greenberg & Haley 1986). If the appointments process is crude, 
salaries should be low rather than high. 
21
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2.2.2. When the Appointments Process Is Sophisticated
Suppose that those who appoint judges—the electorate, elected officials, or 
appointed officials, depending on the system—can easily screen prospec-
tive judges, and reject the various bad types—leisure seekers, status seekers, 
and ideologues with policy goals. If so, increasing the salary will straight-
forwardly improve the pool of those willing to serve as judges, and the qual-
ity of those who are selected. In addition, existing judges will have stronger 
incentives to work hard, as they know that they can be easily replaced with 
possibly superior judges if they shirk.
 There are two difficulties with this argument. First, it is unclear whether 
those who select judges have the proper incentives to screen out the bad 
judges. Electorates might have trouble evaluating prospective judges; 
elected officials and others with the power of appointment might prefer 
appointing cronies. If so, raising salaries will not necessarily improve the 
quality of the people who are appointed to judgeships.
 Second, increasing the pool is costly and creates diminishing returns. 
Suppose that a $10,000 raise will draw one hundred more people into the 
pool. As a result, the relevant agents might (or might not) select a better 
judicial candidate. The price of this additional person is $10,000 times the 
number of existing judges—since everyone receives the raise. The person 
might be worth it, but the larger point is that increasing the pool is not 
costless, and one needs to take into account the costs as well as the benefits 
of producing a larger pool.
 In any event, it is unclear whether existing screening technologies are sophis-
ticated. Leisure and status seekers have an incentive to mimic workaholics and 
people who obtain utility by judging well. If they successfully mimic the good 
types, then they will obtain desirable judgeships. Of course, it may be difficult 
to engage in such mimicking, especially over the long term. And so good-faith 
screeners will take a careful look at the prospective judge’s record as a practic-
ing lawyer or academic. It seems likely that more successful lawyers will also be 
more successful judges. But the process will be imperfect.
 In sum, salary increases will improve the quality of judges only if those 
who select judges themselves have good incentives to screen out bad judges, 
and if they have an effective mechanism for distinguishing good applicants 
and bad applicants. Because states and the federal government have diverse 
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systems for judicial selection, one might predict that salary increases im-
prove performance in some jurisdictions—those with effective selection 
systems—and not others.
2.3. summary
Judges should be paid enough that their total compensation—nonpecuni-
ary as well as pecuniary—equals their social value. Otherwise, lawyers who 
would benefit society by being judges will prefer to work in the private sec-
tor. Because we do not know how much judges value their nonpecuniary 
compensation, and because we do not know their social value, it is hard to 
say whether judges are currently correctly paid, overpaid, or underpaid.
 Beyond this difficulty, we have observed that raising the salaries of sit-
ting judges provides them with no incentive to increase effort or otherwise 
improve their performance unless judges can be fired or otherwise sanc-
tioned for inadequate performance. In the federal system, judges cannot be 
sanctioned for inadequate performance. In many state judiciaries, judges 
who perform inadequately may not be reelected or reappointed. In these 
systems, increasing salaries therefore might improve performance, but only 
if those who reelect and reappoint can properly evaluate judicial outputs.
 In addition, raising the salaries of judges might improve the pool of people 
willing to be judges. But whether that translates into better judicial perfor-
mance depends on the quality of the appointments process. With a broken 
appointments process used by politicians to further their private agendas, the 
benefits of a salary increase will primarily accrue to the politicians. 
2.4. Are Judges Overpaid?
Why pay judges more? We should pay judges more only if the incremental 
increase in pay will improve the social value of judicial performance more 
than the social cost of the higher pay. Given our model of judicial incen-
tives and pay, it is questionable that more pay, by itself, will improve judicial 
output, though it is possible.
 Consider the existing evidence. First, many federal judges stay on the 
bench rather than retire on a full salary. A recent study reports that since 
1984, 80 percent of the federal judges eligible for retirement at full pay 
29
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chose instead to take senior status and keep working (Yoon 2005).8 If judg-
es were underpaid, they would retire and become highly paid practicing 
lawyers, while collecting a pension, often equal to their salary. Instead, they, 
in effect, work for free (Posner 2008; Yoon 2005). Some judges even decline 
senior status and, as a result, give up the ability to do less work for identical 
pay.9 Further, many people who become judges give up millions of dollars of 
compensation as a law firm partner. If people give up huge sums to become 
judges, and judges continue to work when they could stop working without a 
pay cut, the inescapable inference is that the nonpecuniary benefits of being 
a judge—including status and the ability to exercise power over the lives of 
others—substitute for cash compensation, and lots of it.10
 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts has pointed out that real 
pay of federal judges had declined since 1969 because raises since then have 
not kept up with inflation, while the real pay of the average worker has in-
creased during the same time period (Administrative Office Report 2008). 
But 1969 was the year of an approximately 30 percent raise for federal 
8	 In	two	related	articles,	Yoon	looks	at	whether	the	gradual	reduction	in	judicial	salaries	since	
1945	has	corresponded	to	higher	turnover	among	judges	and	whether	reducing	the	age	at	
which	judges	could	take	senior	status	increased	the	rate	at	which	judges	did	take	this	status	
(Yoon	2003;	2006).	The	answer	to	the	first	question	was	no	—	turnover	did	not	increase	as	
a	function	of	the	gradually	decreasing	judicial	salaries.	And	to	the	second	was	a	yes	—	judges	
did	 take	 senior	 status	earlier	when	 the	age	 limit	was	dropped.	Yoon’s	 second	article	 sug-
gests	the	judges	respond	to	monetary	incentives.	But	the	first	article	also	tells	us	that	those	
monetary	 incentives	 are	not	 enough	 to	 induce	 them	 to	give	up	 their	 jobs;	 only	 to	 reduce	
workload.	Yoon’s	studies,	while	telling	us	that	judges	value	the	non-pecuniary	aspects	of	the	
jobs	enough	that	lower	salaries	don’t	induce	them	to	quit,	are	not	able	to	tell	us	about	pro-
ductivity.	Other	articles	examining	the	factors	that	influence	judicial	retirement	include	(Hall	
2001;	Zorn	&	Van	Winkle	2000;	Spriggs	&	Wahlbeck	1995;	Barrow	&	Zuk	1990).	A	recent	
study,	that	looks	at	the	small	number	of	judges	who	resigned	prior	to	eligibility	for	retirement,	
suggests	that	salary	levels	impacted	those	resignation	choices.	The	study	does	not,	however,	
analyze	whether	the	judges	who	resign	are	more	or	less	productive	than	those	who	do	not	
(Kominers	2008).	
9	 Yoon	finds	that	even	when	federal	judges	are	eligible	for	retirement	or	taking	senior	status,	
only	35	percent	of	those	eligible	take	that	option	immediately;	it	takes	up	to	five	years	for	the	
vast	majority	of	these	judges	to	take	even	the	reduced	work	option	(Yoon	2006).	
10	 An	objection	we	have	heard	in	response	to	the	observation	that	the	supposed	low	salaries	do	
not	appear	to	be	causing	judges	to	flee	the	judiciary	in	droves	(especially	in	terms	of	taking	
the	retirement	option)	is	that	the	way	the	pension	benefits	work	for	retirees	is	that	retirees	
get	 their	 full	 salary	 after	 retirement,	 but	not	 any	of	 the	 subsequent	 salary	 increases.	And	
many	current	judges,	expecting	a	major	salary	increase	to	arrive	any	day	now,	are	delaying	
their	retirement	until	then.
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judges, and it is not clear why that year should be chosen as the baseline. The 
Administrative Office also notes that judicial pay has increased less quickly 
than that of some senior government officials, law school deans, and senior 
law professors. But it does not explain why these positions are the relevant 
comparisons. Figure 1 provides another perspective. It compares nominal 
judicial salaries for federal judges with the median income of various cat-
egories of workers. Federal judicial salaries have increased less quickly than 
these median incomes, but overall the changes have not been great. In 1968, 
a circuit judge was paid 8.8 times the median income; in 1969, as a result of
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figure 1: comparison of Judicial salaries and Other Median incomes 1968–2007
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the judicial pay raise, that ratio increased to 12.3. Over the next thirty-five 
years, that ratio gradually declined, with some fluctuations, but as of 2005, 
the ratio was still 7.1. Compared to managerial and professional workers, for 
whom we have less data, judges have done better. From 1982 to 2001, the 
ratio increased from 3.0 to 3.4, with a high of 4.1 in 1993.
 Second, anecdotal evidence for state judgeships teaches a similar lesson. On 
the retirement front, many state judges have lobbied—some have sued—to 
eliminate mandatory retirement ages.11 Candidates for elected state judge po-
sitions expend effort to obtain these judgeships, taking time away from their 
practices. News accounts suggest that candidates for elected judicial positions 
have been spending millions of dollars of campaign funding to win these seats 
(e.g., Cann 2007a; Michels 2007). Why would people devote energy to become 
(and stay) state judges if they are going to be underpaid? Either they think the 
pay is generous or they seek the nonpecuniary benefits of the positions.
 Third, the evidence of judicial compensation in foreign countries is 
more ambiguous than has been recognized (Table 1). While Justice Breyer 
correctly notes that British and Australian judges earn more than Ameri-
can judges, in most other developed countries judges are not paid nearly 
as much.12 A comparison of salaries for judges from twenty-eight member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment shows that the United States is fifth highest in terms of unadjusted
 
11	 In Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. State of Vermont,	904	F.2d	794	(2nd	Cir.	1990),	
Justice	Louis	Peck	of	the	Vermont	Supreme	Court	successfully	challenged	Vermont’s	con-
stitutional	 requirement	 that	 judges	 retire	 at	 age	 70.	 The	 next	 year,	 however,	 in	Gregory v. 
Ashcroft,	501	U.S.	452,	111	S.	Ct.	2395	(1991),	the	Supreme	Court	rejected	a	similar	challenge	
to	the	mandatory	retirement	provision	of	the	Missouri	Constitution,	overruling	Peck’s	victory.	
Following	Gregory v. Ashcroft,	 such	 challenges	have	been	 legislative.	 In	2006,	Hawaii	 vot-
ers	rejected	a	bid	to	repeal	that	state’s	mandatory	retirement	age	of	seventy	(Reyes	2008).	
And	 in	November	2007	Texas	voters	decided	on	Proposition	14	which	repealed	the	Texas	
Constitution’s	mandatory	retirement	for	mid-term	state	judges	over	the	age	of	seventy-five	
(Robbins	2007).	
12	 Justice	Breyer	invoked	the	comparative	by	observing	that	American	federal	judges	“receive	
only	2/3	of	 the	 salaries	of	 their	 judicial	 counterparts	 in	Australia	 and	 1/2	of	 their	 judicial	
counterparts	in	England“	(Hearing	2007a).	
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table 1: Judicial salaries of national high courts, 2004/200513
rank country
Judicial salary 
(in u.s. dollars) cOlA Adjusted salary
1 United Kingdom $331,738 $299,943
2 Ireland $248,678 $270,891
3 Australia $241,498 $264,510
4 New Zealand $211,900 NA
5 united states $203,000 $203,000
6 France $198,201 $212,891
7 Japan $172,346 $144,707
8 Canada $166,800 $166,800
9 Iceland $156,250 NA
10 Luxembourg $141,606 $174,392
11 Netherlands $137,500 $164,868
12 Spain $135,686 $166,282
13 Finland $131,250 $149,487
14 Austria $125,225 $139,449
15 Belgium $117,073 $147,261
16 Denmark $115,568 $114,311
17 Sweden $110,520 $130,330
18 Germany $108,098 $136,487
19 Portugal $96,979 $122,448
20 Norway $94,000 $94,000
21 Greece $70,500 $86,930
22 Italy $58,245 $64,861
23 Poland $46,521 NA
24 Hungary $43,033 NA
25 Czech Republic $37,464 $46,632
26 Turkey $33,948 $36,463
27 Korea $33,600 $27,609
28 Slovak Republic $11,856 $14,388
13	 Obtained	from	Watson	&	Wolfe	(2008)	(providing	cross-country	data	on	judicial	salaries	for	
OECD	nations;	albeit	missing	figures	 for	Mexico	and	Switzerland	that	 the	authors	were	un-
able	to	obtain).	On	the	U.S.	state	courts,	the	salaries	for	judges	on	the	high	courts	are,	for	the	
most	part,	lower	than	those	on	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court.	Salaries	for	Associate	Justices	on	the	
California	Supreme	Court,	ranked	as	the	top	performing	state	high	court	in	a	sister	article,	were	
$182,071	in	2006.	And	the	Associate	Justice	salaries	for	the	lowest	ranking	state	high	court,	
Michigan,	were	$164,610	in	2005	(National	Center	for	State	Courts	Salary Data	2005).	For	the	
“equal	weight	composite	rankings”	of	the	various	U.S.	state	courts,	see	Choi,	Gulati	&	Posner	
(2008).	
62 ~ Choi, Gulati & Posner: Are Judges Overpaid?
salaries (adjusting for cost of living (“COLA”) does not change the ranking 
of the United States significantly)14. Below the United States are a number 
of countries including Germany and Japan that have judiciaries that func-
tion well—well enough to support developed market economies and to keep 
crime low. Finland and Iceland, which pay their high court judges consider-
ably less than the United States, have the lowest scores on the corruption 
perception index as measured by Transparency International (Lambsdorff 
2007).15 And there is no evidence that the countries above the United States 
on the salary scale have better justice systems. Of course, judges have dif-
ferent roles and functions in different countries. Comparing the salaries 
of judges in one country and judges in another may therefore tell us little 
about the present level of U.S. judge salaries. One would also need to take 
account of the salaries of competing positions, pension benefits, and the 
presence or absence of mandatory retirement16—which is not our purpose 
here. Our point is that foreign judicial compensation statistics shed little 
light on the debate about American judicial compensation, and have so far 
been used selectively and crudely to support the case for increasing salaries. 
 Does it matter if judges are overpaid? There are two reasons why it does.
 First, if the government overpays public employees, then people will be 
drawn from the private sector to government work. This might seem attrac-
tive, but there is a problem, namely, that government work is not infinitely 
valuable and private sector work is not valueless. If the person in question 
is paid her marginal productivity in the private sector, and if the government 
overpays, then some people who are more productive in the private sector 
will become less productive government employees. Overpayment is not as 
much a concern in the private sector. If employers overpay employees, then 
the employers will lose profits, fail to attract capital, and go out of business. 
14	 Most	salient,	the	salaries	for	Japanese	high	court	judges	drop	from	seventh	highest	on	the	list	to	
fourteenth.	Data	were	taken	from	the	March	2006	Mercer	Worldwide	Cost	of	Living	Surveys,	
where	data	for	four	sovereigns,	New	Zealand,	Iceland,	Poland,	and	Hungary	were	unavailable.	
15	 Finland	and	Iceland	top	the	charts	with	scores	of	9.6	out	of	10,	whereas	the	United	States	
earns	a	7.3,	putting	it	in	twentieth	place	out	of	163	countries.
16	 For	example,	the	U.S.	federal	system	is	one	of	the	only	ones	in	the	world	that	provides	life	appoint-
ment	(Watson	&	Wolfe	2008).	Japan	is	one	of	the	few	other	countries	that	provides	its	judges	
with	life	appointments.	We	also	suspect	that	the	pension	benefits	in	the	federal	system	in	the	
United	States	are	more	generous	than	those	in	most	other	judiciaries	(Watson	&	Wolfe	2008).	
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Because governments do not have shareholders, but instead raise money from 
taxpayers, and because taxpayers cannot determine whether civil servants are 
overpaid, the danger of overpayment by the government is more severe.
 Second, if the government overpays public employees, then rent-seeking 
will occur, as people compete for these positions. In the case of elected of-
fices, candidates will overinvest in campaigns—as appears to be happen-
ing in some states with elected judiciaries (Goldberg, Holman & Sanchez 
2002). In the case of appointments, prospective judges will overinvest in 
supporting elected officials who have the power to fill judgeships—through 
campaign contributions, campaign assistance, and the like. The more lu-
crative the job, the more that people will compete to be loyal supporters, 
resulting in both diversion from productive activity and (potentially) ex-
cessive loyalty to elected officials—the problem of patronage.
 Making the argument that judges are overpaid is not the purpose of this 
article. But the current debate does not even recognize the possibility of 
overcompensation, let alone its dangers. Our bottom line is that (1) on the 
evidence that has been advanced in public debates, it is as likely that judges 
are overpaid as that they are underpaid, and (2) overcompensation is so-
cially harmful, just as undercompensation is. Ultimately, the theory does 
not provide clear answers; the question boils down to empirics. 
3. An eMpiricAl test
3.1. the data set: state high courts 
What set of conditions—including salary and other aspects of the job—
helps judges work best? Answering this question requires data on how simi-
lar sets of employees perform under different conditions. Using data on the 
performance of a set of federal circuit court judges, who work under similar 
conditions of pay, status, number of law clerks, salary, etc., would enable us 
to rank the judges according to relative performance. But it would not allow 
us to determine what working conditions support higher productivity. For 
that second inquiry, we need employees laboring under different condi-
tions. For example, if judges with three law clerks produce more than judg-
es with two law clerks and a secretary (assuming that the secretary costs the 
same as an additional law clerk), and we think the additional productivity 
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is caused by the difference between a clerk and a secretary, the state might 
want to encourage judges to use a third clerk rather than a secretary. 
 The state high courts present a useful data set because, in each of the fifty 
states, we have a set of judges doing similar tasks, but laboring under differ-
ent conditions (Brace, Hall & Langer 2001). The states vary in how much 
they pay judges, what the mandatory retirement age is, how many law clerks 
the judges have, the salaries of the law clerks, and so on. Among the most im-
portant differences are the different selection and retention processes. Some 
states use elections (both partisan and blind), and others use appointment 
or merit processes and it is likely that the different systems produce judging 
of a different quality. It is easy to overstate the amount of variation in the 
state courts, however; it is considerable as compared to the federal system 
but limited when looked at through an international lens (Epstein, Knight 
& Shvetsova 2001). None of the states, for example, has minimal educational 
qualifications for its judges or uses a civil service model for its judiciary. 
3.2. Measuring performance
The threshold question for any employer attempting to determine which 
factors make its employees more productive is how to measure perfor-
mance. This is a difficult task with judges because the job involves the exer-
cise of qualities such as judgment and fairness that are hard to observe, let 
alone measure in a quantifiable and objective fashion. It is tempting then 
to say—as some do—that the task of measuring judicial performance is 
too difficult (Goldberg 2004; Marshall 2004). But the same measurement 
difficulty exists in many employment settings—doctors, nurses, lawyers, 
bankers, architects, policemen, baseball umpires, etc.—and employees in 
these professions are regularly evaluated by their employers. If employers 
can measure the performance of those professionals, why should the public 
not be able to measure the performance of judges? 
 The reason there has not been significant work on measuring judicial per-
formance, we suspect, is not so much a measurement problem but rather a 
principal problem. That is, the principals (the public) are too dispersed and 
have inadequate incentives to measure the agents in this case — the judges. The 
subset of principals who have control of the selection mechanism, the politi-
cians, do evaluate judges, but we have little information about how they do so. 
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 In putting forward a set of measures, we seek to use objective and repro-
ducible measures. Subjective measures may be better at getting at nuanced 
aspects of an employee’s performance. But subjective measures are also vul-
nerable to bias and inconsistency. Objective and reproducible measures are 
important where the risk that the evaluator will be biased and attempt to 
manipulate the measures is high. Given that evaluating judges is an area 
with political stakes and, therefore, with a danger of evaluators bringing 
their biases to subjective evaluations, the use of objective and reproducible 
measures is important. 
 There exist few systematic attempts to measure the performance of state 
court judges, and almost no academic studies.17 A number of studies compare 
the court systems in the different states, examining the question of whether 
elected judiciaries perform better than appointed ones. In devising measures 
of court performance, though, these studies focus primarily on measures of 
independence and ignore other aspects of the job, such as productivity and 
quality (Cann 2007b). From an employer’s perspective, this is inadequate. In-
dependence is a key element of the job of the judge, but there is no value in an 
independent judge who does not work, decides cases wrongly, or explains her 
decisions inadequately. The closest the literature comes to measuring other 
aspects of judicial performance are studies that use subjective rankings by 
narrow subsets of lawyers or rely on the prior qualifications of the judges (In-
stitute for Legal Reform 2007; Cann 2007b). However, the rankings by a sub-
set of lawyers (e.g., senior counsel of big companies) capture but an aspect of 
court performance relevant to those lawyers. As for the qualifications of the 
judges, it is a leap from looking at what a judge’s prior profession was, how 
long she practiced, or where she went to law school thirty years ago, to the 
inference that he or she must be a better judge than, for example, someone of 
a similar age who went to a lower-ranked law school, practiced for a shorter 
period, or had a different prior profession. 
 We propose measures for three aspects of employee production that we 
assume the hypothetical employers would wish to measure: effort, skill, and 
independence.
17	 For	an	overview	of	the	localized	survey-based	evaluations,	see	Kourlis	&	Singer	(2007)	(pro-
viding	a	general	account	of	the	Judicial	Performance	Evaluation	(JPE)	programs	implemented	
at	the	state	and	local	levels).
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3.3. Measures of productivity
3.3.1. Effort 
Employers prefer employees who work harder, other things equal. An em-
ployee who puts in high effort is likely to be someone who cares about his 
job, who thinks what she is doing is important and relevant. While it is 
difficult to measure whether a judge is being fair, just, or empathetic, it is 
likely that someone who exerts high effort—works longer hours than her 
colleagues who prefer to be at the beach or golf course—cares about the 
job more and is likely to try to be as fair and just as possible, since those are 
crucial characteristics of the job. 
 What measures of judicial output indicate that a judge is exerting ef-
fort? We use opinion publication rates. Publication rates indicate effort 
because producing publication-worthy written explanations for decisions 
is difficult and time consuming. To save time, some judges may instead is-
sue summary dispositions (Pether 2004; Songer 1990). Assuming they have 
not exerted much effort in writing the opinion, they will prefer to avoid 
publication of their summary explanations, for fear of public scrutiny and 
criticism. Alternatively, judges may drag out the time to write an opinion, 
leading to fewer published opinions in any given year (and a corresponding 
increase in the backlog of opinions for the judge). Looking at the number 
of published opinions a judge issues relative to other judges, therefore, pro-
vides a measure of the relative effort exerted by her as compared to the oth-
ers. It is true that the number of opinions that a judge writes will in part be 
determined by the kinds of cases that her court receives (and this may vary 
by state depending on whether the state has mandatory jurisdiction over 
certain types of cases). Even where a court has mandatory jurisdiction over 
some appeals, judges have discretion in choosing what opinions to publish 
and how long they take in writing their opinions. Courts may also develop 
norms; if a majority of judges on a court does not like exerting effort, it may 
be able to pressure newcomers to behave like it does — so court norms may 
be driving some of the publication numbers. The fact remains, however, 
that the newcomer is giving in to that pressure and producing less.
 States also may vary in their norms about what types of opinions are pub-
lication-worthy. To control for that possibility, we use an alternate measure 
of effort: the number of pages published. Judges who write more publishable 
pages, other things equal, are doing more work in providing litigants with 
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explanations and in helping the development of precedent. Again, this is an 
imperfect measure — it may be that Judge A is writing more pages than Judge 
B because he is delegating more of the work to his law clerks and law clerks 
just take longer to explain even basic concepts. That said, almost no judges do 
all of their own writing; most delegate extensively (cf. Choi & Gulati 2005). As 
a rough relative measure, if Judge A consistently writes 500 pages a year more 
than Judge B, Judge A is probably exerting more effort.
  Neither of these measures is perfect. Judges might be productive by writ-
ing a large number of unpublished opinions, resolving disputes even if not 
making precedent. In theory, a judge who writes a large number of unpub-
lished opinions expends more effort than a judge who writes a few published 
opinions. We try to address this problem by including controls for a state’s 
publication rules. In addition, judges might publish more opinions just be-
cause they have more cases, and they might have more cases because there is 
more litigation (or fewer courts) in their state, than in other states. Perhaps 
they have more cases because they write bad opinions that generate uncer-
tainty that leads to disputes. We try to address these problems by controlling 
for court characteristics (such as size) and state characteristics (proxies for 
litigiousness), but we acknowledge that our measure of effort is imperfect.
3.3.2. Measures of Skill
Employers also typically care about employee skill. The standard measure 
used to estimate the quality of judicial production is citation rates. Opin-
ions are products — judges create them and then a variety of customers use 
them. One can estimate the value of the product to the various customer 
groups by examining how much each group uses the product.
 The three customer groups we examine are out-of-state state judges, 
out-of-state federal judges, and authors in the law reviews. We do not use 
inside-state citations or citations from the federal circuit covering that state 
because these citations will often be a function of the fact that the opinion 
in question constituted precedent and, therefore, had to be cited.18 All of 
the other citations, by contrast, are voluntary — citations are made because 
the cited opinion adds value in terms of the arguments it makes. 
18	 Out-of-state	citations	are	also	less	likely	than	in-state	citations	to	be	part	of	standard	string	
citations	used	for	propositions	such	as	the	standard	of	review	because	these	tend	to	be	inher-
ently	local	matters.
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 The disadvantages of using citations as a measure of quality have been 
discussed elsewhere (Posner 2000; Farber 2005). For all their faults, cita-
tion counts are the most popular and useful measure of quality for judicial 
opinions. 
 As with the measurement of effort, the goal is to use a multiplicity of mea-
sures for skill, each of which will capture a different aspect of the value that 
the opinion in question adds. An opinion that legal academics find most in-
teresting because of its nuance and complexity may be the same opinion that 
judges find least useful precisely because of its nuance and complexity.19 
3.3.3. Measures of Independence
Judicial independence means judgment on the merits, uninfluenced by the 
political interests or ideological commitments of political branch officials 
or by the demands of party. A judge’s decision should not be related to her 
political affiliation. It follows that, if judges are independent, Republican 
judges should agree (or disagree) with each other as often as they agree 
(or disagree) with Democratic judges, and vice versa. On the basis of this 
observation, we construct our measure of Independence. 
 “Independence” can also refer to the ability to resist bribery and other 
forms of improper pressure from the parties, and unwillingness to submit 
to pressure from political officials who seek particular outcomes. In many 
parts of the world, bribery and improper political pressure are significant 
problems, but the United States is relatively fortunate in this respect. The 
aspect of independence that remains, the one that is most relevant in the 
U.S. context, is independence from the ideology of the party that appointed 
the judge, or non-partisanship. 
 Our Independence measure uses opposing opinions to measure the de-
gree of disagreement among those of similar political orientations. Oppos-
ing opinions are defined as either a majority opinion when a dissent exists, 
or a dissent when a majority exists. Empirical literature has established that 
judges often vote consistently with policy preferences (typically proxied by 
the political party of the appointing actor) (George 1998; Shepherd 2007). 
19	 Again,	prior	research	suggests	otherwise.	Opinions	with	lots	of	citations	from	one	set	of	cus-
tomers	tend	to	be	the	same	opinions	with	high	citation	numbers	from	other	customers	(Choi	
&	Gulati	2004).	
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A judge who disagrees with those with a similar party background as his is 
demonstrating independence.20
 To calculate this measure, we start with the number of dissents a judge 
issues against other judges on his court with the same political affiliation 
and the number of majority opinions that the judge writes that are opposed 
by a dissent from someone of the same political affiliation. We divide this 
number by the total number of dissents and majority opinions against a 
dissent that a judge authors (the resulting fraction is termed “Opposite_
Party”). If Judge X is a Republican and writes 7 out of his 10 dissents against 
Democratic judges as well as 8 of his 10 majority opinions where there is 
a dissent by a Democratic judge, then Opposite_Party for Judge X would 
equal 15 divided by 20 or 0.75.
 The Opposite_Party number, to provide a comparative measure, has to be 
normalized to take into account the fact the different courts have different 
ratios of judges from the opposing parties. A Republican judge who is on a 
court with one other Republican and eight Democrats will have relatively 
few chances to oppose someone of the same party, whereas if that same Re-
publican judge were on a court with nine Democrats, he would only be op-
posing Democrats because there would be no opportunity to disagree with 
Republicans. To correct for the imbalance problem, we calculate each judge’s 
independence score as a function of what fraction of his court’s opinions 
20	Party	affiliation	information	is	obtained	by	using	three	sources.	First,	we	searched	NEXIS	and	
the	Internet	(using	Google)	for	any	news	reports	on	the	political	affiliation	of	each	judge.	Sec-
ond,	we	also	searched	for	information	on	political	contributions	at	the	opensecrets.org	website.	
In	the	opensecrets	database,	we	searched	for	political	contributions	for	each	judge	by	first	and	
last	name	in	the	state	in	which	the	judge	sits	on	the	high	court.	We	also	looked	at	the	profes-
sion	of	each	donor	as	provided	by	opensecrets—counting	only	donations	by	persons	with	the	
same	first	and	last	name	and	who	either	listed	their	profession	as	on	the	state	high	court	or	who	
listed	a	law	firm	affiliation	(where	we	were	able	to	match	the	judge	to	the	law	firm	through	other	
sources).	We	used	the	political	party	of	the	donee	candidate	as	a	proxy	for	the	political	party	
of	 judges	who	contributed.	Third,	we	used	the	party	of	the	governor	(if	any)	who	appointed	
the	judge	as	a	proxy	for	the	judge’s	political	party.	In	most	of	the	cases	where	we	had	multiple	
sources	of	information	on	political	party,	the	party	was	consistent	across	these	sources.	When	
our	three	sources	reported	different	parties,	we	gave	first	priority	to	the	party	identified	through	
our	NEXIS	and	Internet	searches	and	second	to	the	party	identified	in	the	opensecrets.org	da-
tabase.	In	our	sample,	220	judges	were	classified	as	a	Democrat	and	170	as	a	Republican	(with	
16	no	data	or	Independent	party	judges).	Of	the	390	judges	classified	as	either	a	Democrat	or	
Republican,	35	(or	8.97	percent	)	had	a	conflict	in	our	three	methods	of	determining	political	
affiliation	(Choi,	Gulati	&	Posner	2007).	
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are generated by those from the opposite party (Opposing_Pool). If a court 
has seven out of ten judges who are Democrats and they all write the same 
number of opinions, the three Republican judges will have 70 percent of the 
court’s opinions to oppose. We expect that a Republican judge dissenting at 
random would dissent 70 percent of the time against a Democrat. We defined 
Independence as Opposing_Pool minus Opposite_Party. If one of the Re-
publicans disagrees with his Democratic colleagues 72 percent of the time, we 
estimate an Independence score of –0.02 (that is, the baseline Opposite_Pool 
number 0.70 minus the individual Opposite_Party number 0.72); the nega-
tive score suggests that he is less likely to disagree with those from his own 
party than the baseline. If the fraction of his disagreements that are with his 
Republican colleagues is 68 percent of the time, we count that as a +0.02; be-
cause he is more willing to disagree with those from his party than with those 
from the other party and thus more independent. 
 The measure has problems. One problem is that the Opposite_Party ratio is 
determined from a small number of opinions in question for almost all judg-
es. Judges do not dissent often — it is hard work. Assuming that judges would 
prefer to avoid this additional work, they will seek to compromise where pos-
sible. A judge’s independence score under our measure might therefore be 
the product of only a handful of dissents. A judge who does not often dissent, 
might have had a couple of cases involving issues that he felt strongly about 
during the time period that our data spans. Given that our data spans only a 
handful of years (a short period as compared to the judicial life span for most 
judges), it is possible that some judges have high scores on our independence 
measures due to the random arrival of cases they feel strong enough about 
to dissent against even fellow political travelers on the bench (a situation that 
may not have occurred for most other types of cases). 
 Another issue is that the measure only looks at extreme behavior—situ-
ations where compromise has broken down to the point that the judges are 
engaging in public disagreement. Judges, however, might also be displaying 
independence in their private negotiations with colleagues over case out-
comes and the language of opinions in cases where there end up being no 
dissents; that is, the majority of cases (Revesz 1997). Our measure under-
counts these moderate displays of independence.21 
21	 This	undercounting	problem	is	not	as	severe	if	a	judge’s	ability	to	threaten	dissent	is	a	func-
tion	of	her	actual	willingness	to	dissent.	Those	with	high	dissent	numbers	against	those	from	
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 Our measure differs from the standard measures of independence (or bias) 
used in the empirical literature on judges. Those measures tend to start with a 
series of assumptions about the policy preferences of Democratic judges ver-
sus Republican judges. For example, Democratic judges are typically assumed 
to dislike big corporations, oppose the death penalty, and support criminal 
defendant rights; they favor the little guys (e.g., George & Epstein 1992; Brace 
& Hall 1997; Miles & Sunstein 2008). The cases are then coded as a function 
of the direction of the vote. If it turns out that the Democrat appointed judge 
votes in favor of the individual litigant more often than in favor of the big 
corporation, then the conclusion is that the judge is voting consistent with 
his policy preferences. An example of the use of this methodology is Joanna 
Shepherd’s (2007) recent article where she focuses on whether sitting state 
judges bias their votes in the direction of the policy preferences of the group 
that has the power to decide whether to retain these judges or not (they do, 
even when the judge’s politics differ from those of the group voting on reten-
tion). We do not use this methodology for a couple of reasons. 
 First, the methodology focuses exclusively on votes. Votes capture the 
the	same	party	will	probably	also	be	those	who	are	actively	negotiating	with	their	colleagues.	
It	is	possible,	however,	that	high	dissent	numbers	instead	simply	represent	cantankerousness	
and	an	unwillingness	to	compromise.	
	 	 There	is	an	additional	set	of	problems	that	we	do	address.	First,	the	problem	of	states	that	
are	dominated	by	a	single	party.	Consider	the	case	where	all	 judges	on	a	particular	state	high	
court	are	all	of	the	same	political	party	(say	all	Republican).	Our	Independence	measure	will	equal	
zero	since	Opposite_Party	will	equal	Opposite_Pool	(and	both	will	equal	zero	since	there	are	no	
Democrat-authored	opinions).	Table	4	excludes	judges	who	come	from	states	with	no	variation	
in	political	party	among	judges	for	this	reason.	But,	by	the	same	token,	we	lose	data.	
	 	 Second,	even	where	all	 judges	are	not	of	 the	same	political	party	 in	a	state,	 if	an	 im-
balance	exists,	 the	 range	of	 the	 Independence	variable	will	vary.	Consider	 two	Republican	
judges.	One	is	in	a	state	with	90	percent	of	the	majority	opinions	written	by	Democrats	and	
the	other	is	in	a	state	with	10	percent	of	the	majority	opinions	written	by	Democrats.	For	the	
first,	 Independence	can	 range	 from	–0.1	 to	+0.9.	For	 the	second,	 Independence	can	 range	
from	–0.9	to	+0.1.	So	the	second	judge	could	have	a	much	more	negative	Independence	score	
than	 the	first	 judge	 simply	because	 the	 range	 is	 shifted	over.	To	address	 this,	we	 created	
a	version	of	 the	 Independence	variable	 that	 is	 less	dependent	on	the	background	political	
makeup	of	a	particular	state	court.	Independence_Indicator	is	defined	as	1	if	independence	
is	greater	or	equal	 to	zero	and	zero	otherwise.	The	 indicator	variable	addresses	 the	 range	
problem	but	also	throws	out	information:	it	suggests	judges	subject	to	non-partisan	elections	
are	less	independent	than	the	other	types,	who	are	about	the	same.	None	of	the	differences	
in	mean	Independence_Indicator	levels	among	the	varying	selection	systems	are	statistically	
significant.	There	is	also	the	possibility	that	dissenting	is	a	greater	display	of	independence	
than	writing	a	majority	opinion.	However,	we	 found	no	 significant	differences	exist	 in	 the	
Independence	scores	of	active	dissenters	compared	with	occasional	dissenters	for	judges	of	
any	of	the	four	selection	systems	(Choi,	Gulati	&	Posner	2007).
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underlying political dynamics of an opinion only imperfectly. Two opin-
ions with votes in favor of a corporate litigant, for example, may generate 
different precedent for future opinions depending on how the opinion is 
written. Even if three Democrats on a panel compromise with the two Re-
publicans to write the opinion narrowly, in exchange for voting in favor of 
the corporation (that is, allowing the corporation to win in this case, but 
making it more difficult for corporations to win in the future), the case 
gets coded as having a Republican outcome. Given that political parties 
likely care more about policies rather than individual case outcomes, look-
ing only at voting outcomes may miss the mark. Put another way, reasoning 
and precedent are more important than the vote in any particular decision. 
It is only in the subset of cases involving dissents that we can be confident 
that the issues are important enough to the judges that they are not willing 
to trade votes for reasoning—and therefore examining votes (and against 
whom such votes are cast in a decision) in dissent situations provides a 
more accurate measure of the political dynamics among judges. Over the 
same time period then, our measure yields a smaller number of data points, 
but we can be more confident in the information that they yield. 
 Second, standard measures of independence also rely on subjective ap-
proximations to determine whether a judge’s votes are classified as more 
aligned with Democratic preferences or Republican ones (cf. Epstein, Staudt 
& Wiedenbeck 2006).22 For example, voting against an individual bringing a 
tax challenge against the government might be coded as a Democratic vote be-
cause of an assumption that Democrats are pro-big government. But what if 
it is the case that most individuals who bring tax challenges are poor? Weren’t 
Democrats supposed to favor the little guys, the individual litigants, against 
the government? The same kind of argument can be made with respect to 
coding assumptions in a variety of areas such as securities fraud and medical 
malpractice. The standard measures likely work well in the subset of cases that 
empiricists studying the courts typically focus on — that is, civil rights type 
cases. But they get problematic when one moves away from the hot button ar-
eas into areas such as business law. Given that our data set covers all state high 
court cases decided in a defined period of time (from 1998 to 2000), using the 
22	For	an	examination	(and	critique)	of	some	of	these	coding	assumptions	in	the	tax	context,	see	
Epstein,	Staudt	&	Wiedenbeck	(2006).	
65
Winter 2009: Volume 1, Number 1 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis ~ 73 
standard subjective coding method would result in a potentially high error 
rate. By contrast, our measure codes only those cases where the Democratic 
judges vote (and write) against their Republican counterparts as politically 
divided. Instead of making assumptions about what constitutes Democratic 
or Republican preferences, we in effect allow the judges to tell us. 
4. deterMining the effects Of sAlAry And tenure
4.1. the salary and tenure Mechanisms
The fifty states use a range of tenure and salary combinations. Salaries range 
from $83,550 in Montana to over $150,000 in New York as of 1999. For ten-
ure, at the high end, a few states such as New Hampshire mimic the federal 
system with life tenure. Most states have judicial terms, ranging from just a 
few years, to 14 (New York), and always with the possibility of reappoint-
ment or reelection. A judge’s actual longevity depends on her ability to be 
reelected or reappointed, plus the incentives to retire prior to the end of the 
term. In 1997, median longevity by state was 8.6 years, ranging from a low 
of 3.5 in West Virginia, to a high of 19.1 in Oklahoma.
 The tenure variable presents a potential complication. Because most 
states have mechanisms such as impeachment by which to remove judges, 
there is the possibility that judges in a particular state court might have a 
low tenure because they are no good. That is, the tenure variable may not 
be exogenous. Prior research, however, indicates that the tenure variable is 
stable over time, suggesting only a minimal endogeneity problem (Hanssen 
1999). The tenure variable is highly correlated with the type of selection 
system that a state has (e.g., election versus appointment) and these selec-
tion systems have remained mostly stable over the last few decades, again 
suggesting that the endogeneity problem is not large (Hanssen 1999).
4.2. hypothesis
Conventional wisdom in the salary debate holds that higher wages translate 
into higher judicial productivity. That means that the high-wage judges, 
vis-à-vis their lower wage counterparts, should be exerting more effort, be 
demonstrating higher skill, and exercising greater independence. Theory, 
however, suggests that the operation of wages on production quality will 
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not just be a function of wages, but also of tenure and the quality of the 
selection system. We therefore look to see how judges perform not just un-
der different wage regimes, but different wage, tenure, and selection system 
combinations. Further, participants in the salary debate ignore the fact that 
basic employment conditions such as the number of assistants and their 
wages and tenure likely affect productivity. We examine the impact of vari-
ous employment conditions. 
 To test the hypothesis that higher salary causes higher judicial productivity, 
we use models in which various productivity measures are used as dependent 
variables, and salary and various controls are used as independent variables. 
At the outset, we should address an issue common to all the models. Our 
model is essentially cross-sectional because of data limitations, so we are con-
strained in our ability to get a good handle on causation. If our results show 
higher salaries as correlated with higher productivity, these results could be 
interpreted as showing that greater workloads cause legislatures to raise sala-
ries, rather than showing that higher salaries generate greater output. How-
ever, salaries are more likely to be exogenous than output. Legislatures set 
salaries in response to political pressures, and while those political pressures 
could reflect concerns about judicial quality, much else affects these decisions 
as well. Because courts control their own workload, output is endogenous. In 
any event, because we find either no relationship or a weak relationship be-
tween the two variables, these concerns are largely idle. With our weak results, 
it is likely that neither causal story is correct. 
4.3. data description
4.3.1. The Dataset
The decisions of the high courts of every state for three years (1998-2000) 
constitute the dataset. Texas and Oklahoma have two high courts, for civil 
and criminal appeals, and are counted as two states each, making a total 
of 52 states. The District of Columbia is excluded because of its unusual 
character. The dataset contains 408 judges, approximately 8 per court. The 
average judge spent 2.65 of the 3 years in our sample period on the court. 
Each judge wrote on average about 24.9 opinions per year.
 The data is cut three ways, as a function of the type of data. For effort, 
we examine opinions at the judge level for each year. Each observation is 
a judge for a particular year, giving us 1082 observations (408 times 2.65). 
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For citations, the number of data points is larger because those numbers 
were measurable at the opinion level. There are 27,596 majority opinions. 
Finally, because the data pool is smaller for independence (small number 
of dissents relative to number of opinions or citations), we calculate judge-
level effects for the aggregate of the three years. For independence, there are 
408 observations. The number of observations in the regressions is some-
times lower as a result of incomplete data for certain variables. The states 
vary in terms of the judicial selection mechanisms they use. Table 2 sepa-
rates the staes as a function of the mechanisms they use. 
table 2
Appointed Merit selection non-partisan 
election
partisan election
Connecticut Alaska Georgia Alabama
Delaware Arizona Idaho Arkansas
Hawaii California Kentucky Illinois
Maine Colorado Louisiana North Carolina
Massachusetts Indiana Michigan New Mexico
New Hampshire Iowa Minnesota Pennsylvania
New Jersey Florida Mississippi Texas
New York Kansas Montana West Virginia
Rhode Island Maryland North Dakota
Vermont Missouri Nevada
Virginia Nebraska Ohio
South Carolina Oklahoma Oregon
South Dakota Washington
Tennessee Wisconsin
Utah
Wyoming
Because there is little temporal variation in salaries, our analysis is essentially a 
cross-sectional analysis. We control for the year, but we do not use state fixed 
effects because of the lack of temporal variation. Ideally, we would have data 
over a longer period of time and use state fixed effects. The absence of state 
fixed effects means that our model, if it does not control for all other state-level 
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variation, may not accurately reveal the relationship between salary and pro-
ductivity. To address this problem we include a number of state level controls. 
4.3.2. Variables for the Multivariate Model
We estimate a series of multivariate regression models using our proxies for 
productivity, quality, and independence. Our key independent variable of in-
terest is the associate justice salary level for a particular court. We adjust the 
salary data for the cost of living for the city in which the court is located (Ad-
justed Associate Justice Salary).23 In the multivariate models, we relate our 
proxies for productivity, quality, and independence with Adjusted Associate 
Justice Salary to test the importance of salary for judicial performance. 
 Because our focus is on the differential cost of being a judge, we include 
an opportunity cost measure into our models. To calculate opportunity 
cost, we use the average wage paid to equity partners at large law firms in 
that state (Adjusted Partner Salary). We assume that the type of lawyer who 
might be interested in a state judgeship likely has a local orientation and 
that her best alternative position would be at a local law firm.24 
 The method of judicial selection is also an important determinant of 
productivity, quality, and independence. We include independent variables 
for whether the state high court judges in our sample are selected through 
Partisan Election, Non-Partisan Election, or Merit Selection (as compared 
to the base category of Appointed judges). 
 In addition to our judicial salary and selection variables, we include a set 
of variables relating to the characteristics of each state high court. These 
variables, described below, may also determine judicial performance and 
provide alternate levers for policymakers seeking to affect performance. 
4.3.2.1. Court Characteristic Variables
The court characteristic variables seek to capture differences among states 
with respect to the structure of judicial chambers; they provide a sense of 
23	If	not	available,	a	nearby	city	with	a	similar	profile	in	terms	of	income,	crime	rates,	and	popu-
lation	is	used.
24	A	more	fine-tuned	measure	of	opportunity	cost	might	calculate	not	just	the	difference	be-
tween	judicial	salary	and	average	partner	salary	for	that	year,	but	also	calculate	in	expected	
future	streams	of	earning	for	the	two	jobs.	Such	a	calculation	would	require	both	estimations	
as	 a	 function	of	 age-wage	profiles	 for	 the	 individual	 judges,	 but	 also	detailed	 information	
regarding	the	pension	plans	of	each	state.	
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whether certain court characteristics, such as the wages paid to law clerks, 
have an impact on a judge’s productivity.
 The first variable concerns whether the mix of judges on the high court 
remained the same throughout our sample time period from 1998 to 2000 
(Stable Court) and the size of the bench during the 1998 to 2000 period (Num-
ber of Active Judges on Bench). Teams that have high turnover likely operate 
differently than those that don’t, and the size of the team may impact dynamics. 
We include an indicator variable for whether the judges in a specific court do 
not face mandatory retirement (No Mandatory Retirement). Next, to measure 
the effects of law clerks, three variables are used. The average number of clerks 
per judge for the 1998 to 2000 period is one variable (Number of Clerks Per 
Judge).25 Because long-term clerks—who will be more experienced in the later 
years of their tenure as clerks—may be more effective at assisting the judge, a 
variable for whether the clerkships are longer is used. The typical clerkship at 
the federal level is one year and is considered standard, therefore clerkships last-
ing for two or more years are defined as long-term (Long-Term Clerk).26 
 There is a potential causation issue with some of the clerkship variables. 
On the one hand, it is likely that clerks who are more experienced can help 
their judges more — and the prediction is that more experienced clerks will 
result in higher productivity. On the other hand, low quality judges may 
find a job that provides experienced assistants attractive. So, a state that 
provides its judges with a number of skilled assistants might attract more 
low quality judges, thereby producing the prediction that higher quality as-
sistants will correlate with lower quality judging.
 To capture the opportunity cost of being a law clerk, the difference be-
tween the average salary of an entering associate at a large law firm in that 
state and the law clerk salary is used (Law Clerk Opportunity Cost). Given 
the amount of status, training, and networking benefits clerkships provide, 
25	Although	clerks	are	generally	assumed	to	increase	judicial	productivity	there	has	been	little	re-
search	quantifying	the	effects	of	law	clerks.	An	example	of	the	assumption	about	value	added	by	
clerks	is	the	literature	on	the	caseload	explosion	in	the	federal	courts	in	recent	years.	Judges	are	
thought	to	have	used	clerks	to	help	deal	with	the	caseload	increase	(Richman	&	Reynolds	1996).	
26	A	problem	here	is	that	we	treat	a	wide	range	of	long-term	clerkships	—	ranging	from	two-
year	clerkships	 to	 twenty-year	clerkships	—	as	 the	same.	We	were	not	able	 to	obtain	 the	
more	finely	 calibrated	data.	However,	 as	 explained	 later	 (see	 notes	36,	42,	 and	47	 infra),	
because	California	is	reputed	to	be	unusual	in	terms	of	the	number	of	career	clerks,	we	can	
run	a	robustness	check	separating	out	California.	
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we expect that clerkship salaries will have zero impact on judicial produc-
tivity. Indeed, the scarcity of clerkships and long queues of applicants sug-
gests that clerkship salaries could even be reduced. 
 Judges may also act differently if facing a high workload, particularly if 
an intermediate appellate level court does not exist to help with the work-
load. The log of the number of trial cases in the state measured in 1998 
(ln(Number of Trial Cases in the State)) and an indicator variable for the 
presence of an intermediate appellate court (Intermediate Appellate Court) 
are included.27 The number of clerks and clerk tenure, the size of the bench, 
and the number of trial cases may also influence a judge’s choice to devote 
time to any specific case and those variables are included as well. Courts 
differ in terms of their court rules for publication rules, with some allowing 
the judges discretion and others mandating publication. We use an indica-
tor variable to distinguish states that mandate the publication of all opin-
ions (mandatory publication). These rules could distort the judges’ alloca-
tion of their scarce resources; for example, if they have to publish a lot of 
opinions, the quality of individual opinions might drop.
 In addition to judicial salary and selection variables, we include a set of con-
trol variables in our models of productivity, quality, and independence. The 
control variables divide into two types: Judge Controls and State Controls. 
4.3.2.2. Judge Controls
Our models include an indicator variable for whether the judge was the chief 
judge of the high court (Chief Judge). A chief judge may have less time to au-
thor opinions. The chief judge may also command greater respect and receive 
greater numbers of citations as a result. Additionally, the chief may be able to 
assign herself the more important opinions and garner more citations that 
way (cf. Langer 2003). Also included is the number of years between 1998 and 
27	 To	control	for	the	effects	of	court	control	of	its	docket	on	quality,	we	run	the	regressions	with	a	con-
trol	variable	for	the	ratio	of	cases	resulting	from	mandatory	appeal	to	the	total	number	of	cases.	We	
also	try	to	capture	this	same	effect	by	using	a	variable	that	measures	whether	the	state’s	internal	
publication	rules	mandate	publication	of	opinions	or	allow	the	issuance	of	unpublished	opinions	(the	
former	being	more	likely	in	states	where	the	court	has	discretion	in	the	cases	it	chooses	to	hear).	In	
neither	case	do	these	additional	controls	make	a	difference	to	the	coefficients	for	our	main	results	(cf. 
Brace	&	Hall	1990)	(finding	that	institutional	variables,	such	as	whether	the	state	has	an	intermedi-
ate	appellate	court,	explain	a	significant	portion	of	the	variation	in	dissent	numbers).	
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the year in which the judge received her law degree (Post Law-School Experi-
ence) and the number of years the judge has been on the high court (Court 
Experience). More experienced judges may decide cases with greater skill and 
speed, leading to more opinions and more citations. 
 The problem of judges behaving differently as elections approach is often 
mentioned in criticisms of electoral systems of selecting judges (Bright & 
Keenan 1995; cf. Berkowitz, Bonneau & Clay 2005). To measure the effects of 
elections, we examine whether the judges in our data set raised campaign funds 
during any of the years for which we collected data (Election Spending). A vari-
able for whether a judge retired in 2001 or earlier captures the possibility of end 
game problems of a different sort (Retirement Close) — judges who are about 
to retire have little to lose from sloughing off on the job. Additionally, they may 
be retiring because they no longer find the job interesting.28 Given that Chief 
Justice Roberts expressed concerns about the reduced presence on the bench 
of lawyers from private practice, we calculate a variable for whether the judge’s 
primary prior employment prior to joining the bench was in the private or 
public sector (Private Practice).29 Lastly, we include the PAJID score for each 
judge as developed by Brace, Hall & Langer (2001). These scores locate judges 
on a political continuum from highly conservative (0) to highly liberal (100).
 To capture demographic effects—standard in testing the factors that influ-
ence worker productivity—we use variables for age (Age) and gender (Fe-
male). Prior research has examined judicial behavior as a function of gender, 
age, and educational background.30 For example, women judges have been 
28	If	judges	are	motivated	primarily	by	the	desire	to	serve	the	public,	rather	than	interest	in	the	
job,	the	fact	that	they	no	longer	find	the	job	interesting	should	have	but	a	minimal	effect	on	
their	performance.	
29	Although	a	number	of	prior	studies	have	looked	into	the	impact	of	prior	experience	on	as-
pects	of	judicial	performance,	almost	none	have	used	a	broad	measure	of	productivity,	focus-
ing	 instead	on	narrower	measures,	tending	to	relate	to	 independence	or	bias.	E.g.,	Scott	&	
Ditslear	(2007);	Taha	(2004);	Ashenfelter,	Eisenberg	&	Schwab	(1995);	Brudney,	Schiavoni	
&	Merritt	(1999);	Sisk,	Heise	&	Morriss	(1998).	Among	the	exceptions	that	do	look	to	the	
impact	of	background	on	broader	measures	of	judicial	productivity	are	Baker	(2008);	Lan-
des,	Lessig	&	Sollimine	(1998).	Going	further	back,	Caldeira	looked	to	whether	occupational	
background	was	a	predictor	of	judicial	“greatness”	(Caldeira	1988).	
30	Among	 the	 studies	 examining	 the	 effects	 of	 gender,	 age,	 and	 educational	 background	on	
aspects	of	 judicial	behavior,	see, e.g.,	Songer,	Davis	&	Haire	(1994);	Smyth	&	Bhattacharya	
(2003);	Teitelbaum	(2006).	
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hypothesized to behave differently in discrimination cases than their male 
counterparts (Peresie 2005). With age, it has been suggested that younger 
judges are more politically biased and more productive than their older coun-
terparts (Teitelbaum 2006; Baker 2008). Further, the problem of older judges 
overstaying their welcome, particularly on the U.S. Supreme Court, has led 
to proposals for mandatory retirement (Crampton & Carrington 2005). 
To test this, we include variables for age and for whether the state has manda-
tory retirement. The latter, mandatory retirement, might capture a selection 
effect —in that the type of individual attracted to a job that mandates retire-
ment might be different from one who wants to hold on to power and status 
until he is physically unable to do so any longer.31 
4.3.2.3. State Controls
State controls include variables relating to the general characteristics of 
each state. These controls help correct for the possibility that differentials 
in state characteristics, rather than the institutional characteristics we are 
interested in, might be driving the results. Differences in state population 
(ln(Population)), gross state product (ln(Gross State Product)), and crime 
rates (Crime Index) may lead to different mixes of cases and judicial re-
sponses to these cases. Likewise, the median age of the population (Median 
Age of Population) and state median per capita income (State Median In-
come) as measured in the 2000 U.S. Census may affect the mix of cases and 
judicial response. Prior research suggests that judges are influenced by their 
colleagues in neighboring states—plus, states may be more likely to borrow 
from the law of their neighbors than from distant states because of famil-
31		Given	that	we	look	at	multiple	occupational	background	variables	(experience	on	the	bench,	
years	 after	 graduation,	 and	whether	 one’s	 prior	 primary	 occupation	was	 in	 the	 private	 or	
public	sector)	and	given	that	judges	are	not	typically	appointed	until	middle	age,	we	did	not	
expect	eliteness	of	law	school	attended	to	be	a	useful	predictor	of	judicial	performance.	How-
ever,	increasing	the	quality	of	credentials	has	long	been	a	goal	of	judicial	reform	movements.	
Our	cynical	reading	of	this	goal	and	the	history	of	the	move	toward	merit	selection	is	that	this	
goal	appears	to	have	been	driven	more	by	the	desire	to	enhance	the	status	of	the	profession	
than	a	belief	that	these	credentials	translate	into	better	judging.	See	Carrington	(1988).	As-
suming	that	the	goal	is	to	raise	credentials	then,	independent	of	productivity,	we	find	it	the	
case	that	a	higher	law	school	rank	under	the	U.S.	News	correlates	with	a	higher	salary.	See	
infra	(discussion	of	results).	But	the	effect	is	not	significant.	Cutting	the	data	more	finely,	we	
see	that	raising	salaries	increase	credentials	only	in	merit	states;	perhaps	that	is	so	because	
lawyers	pick	judges	in	the	merit	systems	and	they	are	more	impressed	with	credentials.	
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iarity, if those neighbors have more developed laws (Harris 1986). Further, 
larger neighboring states might produce more or different types of cases. 
For these reasons, we calculate a variable for the aggregate population of 
border states (ln(Border Population)). 
 We also include a measure of the age of the state (State Age). Older states likely 
have longer judicial traditions, more precedent, and perhaps a more sophisticated 
jurisprudence on which contemporary jurists can draw. State Age controls for 
the possibility that judges from older states are cited more often outside of the 
state just because they can draw on the more sophisticated jurisprudence of their 
state. We include the fraction of the population comprised of blacks as obtained 
from the 2000 Census (Black Population Fraction). Greater racial heterogeneity 
may produce greater complexity in the mix of cases that go to the state high court 
and affect a judge’s attitudes toward such cases. We include a variable for citizen 
ideology based on election results in each district (Citizen Ideology Score).32 The 
background ideology of the citizens of a state may affect the behavior of judges
 Other variables such as the number and educational backgrounds of 
staff attorneys, the differentials in judicial pension systems across states, or 
the educational backgrounds of the law clerks would have also been useful 
to include. Adequate data, however, was not available.
4.4. Effort
Our first multivariate model focuses on the total number of opinions au-
thored yearly by a judge as our measure of effort. Figure 2 displays a mean 
comparison of the total number of opinions for judges paid less than or 
equal to the median adjusted associate justice salary and judges paid greater 
than the median. For purposes of reporting summary statistics, we divide 
the states into states where the salaries are above the median and those where 
it is below. The median salary of an associate justice in 1999 was $111,758. 
Judges paid above the median are more productive than those below. The 
mean difference is significant at the <1 percent confidence level.
32	 This	variable	is	taken	from	Berry,	Ringquist	&	Hanson	(1998)	(updated	data	available	at	www.uky.edu).
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figure 2: productivity by salary
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Other factors may affect the effort exerted by a judge on a particular court. 
We estimate a multivariate model with number of opinions authored in a 
year as the dependent variable. The equation estimated, using an ordinary 
least squares regression with standard errors clustered by state:
ln(Total_Opinionsi) = α + ß1iAdj. Assoc. Justice Salary + ß2iAdj. Partner Salary
 + ß3iElection_Partisan + ß4iElection_Non-Partisan 
  + ß5iMerit_Plan + ∑ßjiCourt Characteristicsji 
  + ∑ßkiJudge Controlski + ∑ßliState Controlsli 
  + Year Effects + ei
The model relates the log of the total number of opinions per active judge 
per year, with the Adjusted Associate Justice Salary for the judge. The Ad-
justed Partner Salary for the state is included as a control for the oppor-
tunity cost of becoming a judge. The regression model includes year-level 
Court Characteristic variables and Judge and State Controls. 
 The selection method used by a state will affect both the type of person 
who becomes a judge and the incentives facing judges to produce published 
opinions. Accordingly, indicator variables for Non-Partisan Election, Parti-
san Election, and Merit Plan states are included. The three variables use Ap-
pointed states as the baseline. The model includes year fixed effects. Model 1 
of Table 3 reports results. A variation on Model 1 is also reported, replacing 
the selection method for judges with the average tenure of judges in a par-
ticular state (Tenure). Reported as Model 2, the variation allows examination 
of the importance of the retention mechanism on judicial effort. Judges with 
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longer tenures (more job security) may face fewer pressures to exert effort.
 For Models 1 and 2, we see that the coefficient on the associate justice vari-
able is positive and significant only in Model 2 (at the 10 percent level) and 
the coefficient on the partner salary variable is not significant.33 Higher ju-
dicial salaries only weakly correlate with greater productivity (opinions writ-
ten). Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is relatively small. For a $10,000 
increase in salary, under Model 1, effort increases by 6.6 percent (and 9.4 
percent under Model 2). The mean level of opinion production for judges in 
our sample was 24.9 opinions per year.  For the mean judge, $10,000 more in 
compensation corresponds to an increase of 1.6 and 2.3 more opinions per 
year for Models 1 and 2. We see, however, that greater job security does not 
correlate with higher productivity; the Tenure measure (Model 2) correlates 
with lower productivity at the 5 percent significance level.34 
33	Unreported,	when	we	use	an	opportunity	variable	calculated	as	the	difference	between	Part-
ner	Salary	minus	Judge	Salary,	the	coefficient	is	not	significant.	
34	The	regression	models	in	Table	3	utilize	an	indicator	variable	for	whether	the	state	has	a	man-
datory	publication	rule	for	opinions	to	control	for	workload	differences	among	the	states.	We	
lack	data	for	these	variables	for	all	our	states.	As	a	robustness	test,	we	omit	the	Mandatory	
Publication	indicator	variable	from	the	Model	1	in	Table	3	and	re-estimate	the	model	instead	
with	the	addition	of	indicator	variables	for	whether	the	state	high	court	has	mandatory	juris-
diction	over	civil	(Mandatory	Civil	Jurisdiction)	or	criminal	(Mandatory	Criminal	Jurisdiction)	
cases.	Unfortunately,	we	lack	information	on	these	variables	for	all	of	our	states	and	only	use	
them	for	robustness	tests.	Unreported,	the	coefficient	on	associate	justice	salary	is	positive	
but	not	significantly	different	from	zero.	
	 	 As	additional	robustness	tests,	we	re-estimate	Model	1	with	the	replacement	of	ln(Total	
Opinions)	with	 the	 log	of	 the	 total	number	of	pages	written	yearly	 for	our	sample	 judges	
(ln(Total	Pages))	as	the	dependent	variable.	Under	this	alternative	specification,	higher	as-
sociated	justice	salary	correlates	with	more	pages	written	but	the	relationship	is	not	statisti-
cally	 significant.	We	also	 re-estimate	Model	 1	with	 the	 replacement	of	 ln(Total	Opinions)	
with	the	log	of	the	total	number	of	majority	opinions	authored	yearly	for	our	sample	judges	
(ln(Majority	Opinions))	as	the	dependent	variable.	Unreported,	the	coefficient	on	associate	
justice	salary	is	positive	and	insignificant.
	 	 We	also	re-estimate	Model	1	with	the	addition	of	an	indicator	variable	for	whether	the	
judge	also	teaches	as	an	adjunct	professor	(Professor).	Unreported,	the	model	produces	the	
same	qualitative	results	as	Model	1.	The	coefficient	on	judicial	salary	is	positive	and	signifi-
cant.	The	coefficient	on	Professor	is	positive	but	not	significantly	different	from	zero.
	 	 We	re-estimate	Model	1	with	the	addition	of	an	indicator	variable	for	whether	the	judge	
comes	from	a	state	that	gives	its	high	court	judges	lifetime	employment	(Lifetime).	Unreported,	
the	model	produces	the	same	qualitative	results	as	Model	1.	The	coefficient	on	judicial	salary	is	
positive	but	insignificant.	The	coefficient	on	Lifetime	is	negative	but	also	insignificant.
	 	 Lastly,	we	re-estimate	Model	1	with	the	addition	of	indicator	control	variables	for	whether	
the	state	is	a	member	of	U.S.	Census	region	Mid-West,	Northeast,	or	South	(using	West	as	the	
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 There are other variables with larger coefficients — important information for 
those who seek to increase judicial effort. The type of selection system matters. 
Election Partisan, Election Non-Partisan, and Merit selection states have more 
productive judges compared with states that use Appointment systems (Choi, 
Gulati & Posner 2007). The presence of a stable court also correlates with greater 
productivity, whereas closeness to retirement correlates with lower productivity. 
table 3: effort
Model 1 Model 2
dependent variable ln(Total Opinions) ln(Total Opinions)
independent variables
Adjusted Associate Justice Salary 0.007 0.009
+
(1.510) (1.830)
Adjusted Partner Salary -0.001 -0.001
(-1.030) (-1.050)
Election Partisan 0.518*
(2.620)
Election Non-Partisan 0.299+
(1.730)
Merit Plan 0.262
(1.490)
Tenure -0.039*
(-2.270)
Stable Court 0.359* 0.322*
(2.250) (2.130)
Number of Active Judges -0.009 0.032
(-0.230) (1.280)
No Mandatory Retirement -0.289+ -0.303*
(-1.880) (-2.170)
Long-Term Clerk -0.131 -0.033
(-1.060) (-0.300)
Number of Clerks Per Judge 0.036 0.053
(0.390) (0.580)
base	case).	Unreported,	the	coefficient	on	associate	justice	salary	is	positive	and	significant	at	
the	10	percent	level.	As	with	Model	1,	however,	the	coefficient	is	not	large	in	magnitude.	
	 	Overall,	our	robustness	tests	reveal	that	the	relationship	between	higher	judicial	salary	
and	productivity	is	weak.	In	many	of	our	tests,	the	correlation	is	not	statistically	significant.	
Even	where	significant,	the	relationship	is	small	in	magnitude	relative	to	other	aspects	of	the	
high	court	system.
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Law Clerk Opportunity Cost -0.009* -0.008*
(-2.200) (-2.300)
ln(Trial Cases in the State) -0.091 -0.061
(-1.110) (-0.770)
Intermediate Appellate Court -0.232 -0.231
(-0.820) (-0.870)
Mandatory Publication 0.232+ 0.132
(1.780) (0.900)
Chief Judge -0.147* -0.161*
(-2.520) (-2.660)
Court Experience 0.009+ 0.011*
(1.860) (2.230)
Post-Law School Experience 0.007 0.004
(1.100) (0.660)
Retirement Close -0.208** -0.215**
(-3.990) (-3.950)
Age 0.001 0.004
(0.130) (0.760)
Female -0.043 -0.048
(-0.660) (-0.720)
Private Practice -0.028 -0.029
(-0.290) (-0.290)
Election Spending -0.035 -0.023
(-0.570) (-0.360)
PAJID Score 0.003+ 0.003
(1.840) (1.550)
Constant 31.037** 29.551**
(3.830) (4.060)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes
N 998 998
Adj. R2 0.2146 0.2155
The	t-statistics	(in	parentheses)	are	calculated	using	standard	errors	clustered	by	state.	
Variable	definitions	are	in	the	Appendix.
+	Coefficient	significant	at	the	10	percent	level	or	less.
*	Coefficient	significant	at	the	5	percent	level	or	less.
**	Coefficient	significant	at	less	than	the	1	percent	level.
Model 1 Model 2
dependent variable ln(Total Opinions) ln(Total Opinions)
independent variables
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Interestingly, given the push in many states to remove or modify the cur-
rent mandatory retirement ages for judges, the lack of a mandatory retirement 
age correlates with lower effort. This may be because courts without a manda-
tory retirement age have older judges who are unable to exert as much effort. 
The coefficient on the Age variable, however, is not significantly different from 
zero.35 Alternatively, perhaps there is a screening effect resulting from mandato-
ry retirement. The types of individuals attracted to a job that requires manda-
tory retirement may be different from (and more inclined to exert effort than) 
those attracted to a job without mandatory retirement. Also interesting, given 
the asserted need to use higher salaries to attract more candidates from the pri-
vate sector, is that the coefficient on private practice is not significant; lawyers 
whose primary prior profession was in private practice do not turn out to be 
more productive than their colleagues from the public sector. 
 The results for the clerkship variables are surprising. Having long-term 
clerks does not correlate significantly with judicial output; if anything, the cor-
relation is negative. Surely, long-term clerks are better at their jobs than short-
term ones who usually have only just graduated from law school. If so, it is 
likely that there is a selection effect at play here as well.36 Perhaps judges who 
use long-term clerks are inherently less productive (that is why they are attract-
ed to the job that provides better assistance) and that this lack of increase in 
judge productivity is driving the non-effect. Surprising also is that the number 
of clerks does not correlate with productivity. Again, it seems uncontroversial 
that more clerks can do more work than fewer clerks. So, the lack of correlation 
here might again be telling us something about selection effects.
 Finally, law clerk opportunity costs show up in both models as negatively 
correlated with effort (significant at the 5 percent level). The higher the cost of 
becoming a law clerk, perhaps the lower the skill level of the clerks who apply 
for the job. In the context of the salary debate, the point here is that raising clerk 
35		Nor	is	the	variable	for	gender.
36	Among	the	comments	we	received	to	a	prior	draft	were	some	from	career	clerks	on	the	Califor-
nia	high	court	who	asserted	that	lumping	in	the	career	clerks	in	California	with	the	two-year	and	
three-year	clerks	that	other	states	might	be	using	was	likely	distortionary.	The	claim	being	that	
the	effect	of	long-term	clerks	in	California	was	likely	positive.	As	a	robustness	test,	we	added	an	
additional	indicator	variable	for	California	clerk	separate	from	the	long-term	clerk	variable	(with	
non-long-term	clerks	as	the	base	category).	The	coefficients	on	long-term	clerk	and	California	
clerk	were	both	negative	and	not	significantly	different	from	zero.	The	coefficient	on	the	judicial	
salary	variable	was	not	significantly	different	from	zero.
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salaries looks to be more likely to produce the same increase in the number of 
published opinions as raising judge salaries by the same amount. 
 Recall that our model of judicial compensation implies that salary should 
matter most when judges can lose their jobs. To investigate this possibility, we 
see whether the effect of judicial salary on productivity varies according to 
the type of selection system, length of tenure,37 and the presence of lifetime 
employment. Table 4 reports the data using a division of our data based on 
whether the judge is from a state with greater than (or less than or equal to) 
the median adjusted associate justice salary for the fifty-two states.38 
table 4: total number of Opinions (yearly) and Judge selection and retention
Adj. Assoc. Justice 
salary less than or 
equal to Median
Adj. Assoc. Justice 
salary greater than 
Median
p-value
election partisan 21.8 30.2 0.021
election 
non-partisan
26.2 32.4 0.007
Merit 25.0 22.8 0.103
Appointed 23.3 17.5 0.000
tenure less than 
or equal to Median
23.2 28.7 0.000
tenure greater 
than Median
26.2 24.4 0.204
not lifetime 
employment
24.9 26.7 0.099
lifetime 
employment
22.6 15.7 0.002
Elected Partisan judges, judges with shorter tenure, and judges without lifetime 
employment work harder when salary is higher—what our model suggests (al-
though the productivity differential for judges without lifetime employment is 
significant at only the 9.9 percent level). Judges behave like the rest of us — they 
37	We	use	the	median	tenure	of	justices	for	our	sample	of	fifty-two	states	measured	as	of	1997	
(equal	to	7.75	years).	
38	We	use	the	median	adjusted	associate	salary	for	our	sample	of	fifty-two	states	measured	as	
of	1997	(equal	to	$103,410).	
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exert more effort when they have more to lose and when their bosses (as op-
posed to their agents who may care about other things) are watching. 
 To provide a multivariate test of the mean comparison tests of Table 4, we re-
place the Adjusted Associate Justice Salary variable with an indicator variable for 
salaries greater than the median Adjusted Associate Justice Salary for our sample 
states (Big Salary). We also add interaction terms between the method of judge 
selection (Election Partisan, Election Non-Partisan, and Merit) and Big Salary 
to Model 1 of Table 3. Unreported, Big Salary does not correlate with increased 
productivity in general or when interacted with the method of judge selection. 
We similarly add Big Salary and interaction terms between Big Salary and the 
Tenure variable to Model 2 of Table 3. Unreported, Big Salary now does corre-
late with increased productivity at the <1 percent significance level. In contrast, 
the interaction term between Big Salary and Tenure is negative and significant at 
the <1 percent level). Evidence exists therefore that where judges face competi-
tive pressure (shorter tenure), greater salary levels correlate with increased effort 
compared with where judges face less competitive pressure (higher tenure). 
4.5. Quality
The number of outside state citations per opinion is our measure of opin-
ion quality. Outside state citations include outside federal court citations 
(including U.S. Supreme Court citations) and outside state court citations. 
We measure the number of outside state citations using the LEXIS Shepa-
rd’s service up until January 1, 2007. Figure 3 compares mean outside cita-
tions for judges paid more and less than the median salary. Judges paid less 
generate more citations than those paid more. The t-test of the difference 
is not significant, but at this stage it does not appear that higher salaries are 
inducing higher quality opinions.                    
 What about other factors? The following model using ordinary least 
squares and standard errors clustered by judge is estimated.
ln(1+Outside State Citationsi) = α + ß1iAdj. Assoc. Justice Salary 
  + ß2iAdj. Partner Salary + ß3iElection_Partisan 
  + ß4iElection_Non-Partisan + ß5iMerit_Plan 
  + ß6iNumber Dissents + ß7iWest Key Pages
  + ß8iOpinion Length + ∑ßjiSubject Matterji 
  + ∑ßkiCourt Characteristicski 
  + ∑ßliJudge Controlsli + ∑ßmiState Controlsmi 
  + Year Effects + ei
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The model relates the number of outside state citations (Outside State Cita-
tions) for any specific majority opinion with measures for salary and op-
portunity costs. 
 Because this model is estimated at the opinion level, it includes Opin-
ion Characteristic controls. These include the number of dissents written 
against the majority opinion in question (Number of Dissents). A majority 
opinion with one or more dissents may deal with more novel issues of law 
and generate more citations as a result. The model includes the number of 
west key pages (West Key Pages) as a rough measure of the topical impor-
tance of the opinion.39 Similarly the model includes the length of the opinion 
(Opinion Length); longer opinions are more likely to contain analysis that 
other judges may cite compared with shorter opinions, all other things being 
equal. To control for the disproportionate effect that cases in certain subjects 
might have (and some states may receive more of these), we include subject 
matter fixed effects for twelve different subject matter categories, including 
Administrative, Attorney and Client, Capital Punishment, Church and State, 
Commercial, Criminal, Family, First Amendment, Labor, Property, Rights, 
and Torts.40 The category of Other opinions is the baseline.
39	An	issue	with	using	this	variable	is	that	it	may	dampen	the	effect	that	we	are	trying	to	mea-
sure,	since	both	the	left	and	right	hand	side	now	have	variables	that	measure	opinion	quality.	
What	we	are	trying	to	separate	out,	though,	is	the	effect	of	judge	quality	from	the	effect	of	
having	hit	a	number	of	important	topics	(or	having	had	the	luck	to	get	a	case	that	raises	nu-
merous	important	issues	first).	And	the	West	Key	Note	variable	is	aimed	at	doing	that.	
40	The	subject	matter	controls	are	chosen	as	a	function	of	the	subjects	that	are	often	suggested	
in	the	literature	as	being	most	salient	to	judges,	both	on	the	state	and	federal	courts.	See	Choi	
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 Court Characteristic variables and Judge and State Controls are used in 
the model. Because we count citations up until January 1, 2007, precisely 
when a judge retires is important. A judge who retires in 2000 may find his 
influence wane immediately after retirement, leading to fewer citations of his 
opinions by 2002. In contrast, a judge who retires in 2004 may not see as great 
a reduction in citations in our count until January 1, 2007. To control for this 
possibility, instead of a single Retirement Close variable, we use a set of more 
specific indicators for whether retirement occurred in 2001 or earlier, 2002, 
2003, 2004, or 2005. Year fixed effects are also estimated. 
&	Gulati	(2008);	McLeod	(2007);	Champagne	(2005).	
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table 5: Quality
Model 1 Model 2
dependent variable ln(Total Opinions) ln(Total Opinions)
independent variables
Adjusted Associate Justice  Salary 0.001 0.000 
(1.430) (0.630)
Adjusted Partner Salary 0.000 0.000 
(0.180) (–0.610)
Election Partisan –0.036 
(–1.410)
Election Non-Partisan 0.008 
(0.350)
Merit Plan –0.058* 
(–2.330)
Tenure 0.000 
 (–0.160)
Stable Court –0.050** –0.039*
(–2.890) (–2.200)
Number of Active Judges –0.021** –0.017** 
(–4.210) (–3.080)
No Mandatory Retirement –0.002 0.001 
(–0.120) (0.040)
Long-Term Clerk –0.086** –0.081** 
(–5.460) (–5.140)
Number of Clerks Per Judge –0.011 –0.010 
(–0.910) (–0.790)
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Law Clerk Opportunity Cost 0.003** 0.002** 
(5.320) (4.710)
ln(Trial Cases in the State) –0.000 0.000 
(–0.000) (0.040)
Intermediate Appellate Court 0.020 –0.017 
(0.720) (–0.620)
Mandatory Publication –0.014 –0.015 
(–0.880) (–0.840)
Constant –6.469** –5.787** 
(–6.670) (–6.430)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Opinion Characteristic Controls Yes Yes
Judge Controls Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes
Subject Matter Controls Yes Yes
N 18321 18321
Adj. R2 0.1341 0.1327
The	t-statistics	(in	parentheses)	are	calculated	using	standard	errors	clustered	by	judge.	Variable	
definitions	are	in	the	Appendix.
+	Coefficient	significant	at	the	10	percent	level	or	less.
*	Coefficient	significant	at	the	5	percent	level	or	less.
**	Coefficient	significant	at	less	than	the	1	percent	level.
Model 1 Model 2
dependent variable ln(Total Opinions) ln(Total Opinions)
independent variables
 Model 1 of Table 5 reports results. As before, we re-estimate Model 1, 
replacing the selection method for judges with the average tenure of judges 
in a particular state (Tenure). The results of the model with the Tenure vari-
able are reported as Model 2. 
 The coefficients on both the salary and opportunity cost measures are 
small and statistically insignificant. For Model 1, a $10,000 increase in sal-
ary correlates with only a 1 percent increase in the number of outside state 
citations per opinion. Salary does not appear to make a difference in deter-
mining quality. 
 As with effort, other factors correspond to more significant changes in 
the number of citations. Judges in Merit Plan states have lower levels of 
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outside state citations (corresponding to 5.8 percent fewer citations re-
spectively compared with Appointed judge states respectively in Model 1). 
Judges from stable courts correlate with fewer outside state citations and 
the number of active judges correlates with reduced outside state citations 
in Models 1 and 2. The presence or absence of mandatory retirement ap-
pears to make no significant difference to the quality.41 
 On law clerks, shorter-term clerks correlate with 8.6 percent and 8.1 per-
cent greater outside state citations per opinion compared with long-term 
clerks in Models 1 and 2. Judges with shorter-term clerks not only pro-
duce more opinions (reported in Table 3), they produce opinions of higher 
quality.42 Surprisingly, the opportunity cost of being a clerk shows up with 
a positive (albeit small) coefficient in both models. Perhaps there is an in-
verse correlation between the quality of life at a job at a law firm and the 
salary that the law firm pays (with the biggest cities obviously paying more 
and having jobs that are more unpleasant). But it is puzzling that the sign 
on the coefficient is positive for the quality analysis and was negative for 
the effort analysis.43 
41	 Unreported	 in	Table	5,	 it	does	not	make	a	significant	difference	to	quality	as	to	whether	a	
judge’s	primary	prior	profession	was	in	the	private	sector.
42	As	a	robustness	test,	we	added	an	additional	indicator	variable	for	California	clerk	separate	
from	the	long-term	clerk	variable	(with	non-long-term	clerks	as	the	base	category).	The	coef-
ficients	on	long-term	clerk	remained	negative	and	significantly	different	from	zero;	the	coef-
ficient	on	California	clerk	was	positive	but	not	significantly	different	from	zero	(indicating	a	
similar	effect	for	California	clerks	as	short-term	clerks	on	outside	citations).	The	coefficient	
on	the	judicial	salary	variable	was	not	significantly	different	from	zero.
43	The	 regression	models	 in	Table	5	utilize	 an	 indicator	 variable	 for	whether	 the	 state	has	a	
mandatory	publication	rule	for	opinions	to	control	for	workload	differences	among	the	states.	
As	a	robustness	test,	we	omit	the	Mandatory	Publication	indicator	variable	from	the	Model	
1	 in	Table	5	and	re-estimate	the	model	 instead	with	 the	addition	of	 indicator	variables	 for	
whether	the	state	high	court	has	mandatory	jurisdiction	over	civil	(Mandatory	Civil	Jurisdic-
tion)	or	criminal	(Mandatory	Criminal	Jurisdiction)	cases.	Unfortunately,	we	lack	information	
on	these	variables	for	all	of	our	states	and	only	use	them	for	robustness	tests.	Unreported,	
the	coefficient	on	associate	justice	salary	is	positive	but	not	significantly	different	from	zero.	
	 	 As	a	robustness	test,	we	replace	ln(Outside	Citations)	with	the	log	of	one	plus	the	num-
ber	of	 law	review	citations	to	an	opinion	(ln(1+Law	Review	Citations))	in	Model	1	of	Table	
5.	Using	this	alternative	specification,	we	obtain	a	stronger	relationship	between	salary	and	
law	review	citations	compared	with	Table	5.	Higher	associat	 justice	salary	correlates	with	
significantly	more	law	review	citations.	The	coefficient	on	associate	judge	salary,	nonethe-
less,	is	small	in	magnitude	(0.003).	A	$10,000	pay	increase	correlates	with	only	a	3	percent	
increase	in	the	number	of	law	review	citations.	
	 	 We	re-estimate	Model	1	with	the	addition	of	an	indicator	variable	for	whether	the	judge	also	
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 table 6: Outside citation/Quality comparison
Adj. Assoc. Justice 
salary less than or 
equal to Median
Adj. Assoc. Justice 
salary greater 
than Median
p-value
election partisan 0.848 0.591 0.000
election non-partisan 0.636 0.667 0.471
Merit 0.709 0.820 0.021
Appointed 0.720 1.153 0.000
tenure less than or 
equal to Median
0.750 0.730 0.617
tenure greater than 
Median
0.650 0.782 0.000
not lifetime 
employment
0.695 0.730 0.203
lifetime employment 0.724 1.983 0.000
 Table 6 compares the mean number of outside state citations per major-
ity opinion for judges who make less than or equal to the median salary 
teaches	as	an	adjunct	professor	(Professor).	Unreported,	the	model	produces	the	same	qualita-
tive	results	as	Model	1.	The	coefficient	on	judicial	salary	is	positive	but	not	significantly	different	
from	zero.	The	coefficient	on	Professor	is	negative	and	significant	at	the	10	percent	level.	Appar-
ently	those	judges	who	spend	time	as	adjunct	professors	produce	lower	quality	opinions.
	 	 We	next	re-estimate	Model	1	with	the	addition	of	an	indicator	variable	for	whether	the	
judge	comes	from	a	state	that	gives	 its	high	court	 judges	 lifetime	employment	(Lifetime).	
Unreported,	the	model	produces	the	same	qualitative	results	as	Model	1.	The	coefficient	on	
judicial	salary	is	positive	but	not	significantly	different	from	zero.	The	coefficient	on	Lifetime	
is	positive	and	insignificant.
	 	 We	also	re-estimate	Model	1	without	the	Opinion	Length	variable.	Longer	opinions	may	
also	 indicate	 higher	 quality	 opinions.	 By	 controlling	 for	 opinion	 length,	we	may	 artificially	
reduce	correlation	between	citations	and	overall	opinion	quality	in	our	model.	In	the	model	
without	the	Opinion	Length	variable,	the	coefficient	on	associate	justice	salary	is	positive	but	
not	significantly	different	from	zero.
	 	 Lastly,	we	re-estimate	Model	1	with	the	addition	of	indicator	control	variables	for	whether	
the	state	is	a	member	of	U.S.	Census	region	Mid-West,	Northeast,	or	South	(using	West	as	the	
base	case).	Unreported,	the	coefficient	on	associate	justice	salary	is	positive	and	insignificant.	
	 	 Overall,	our	robustness	tests	reveal	that	the	relationship	between	higher	judicial	salaries	and	
opinion	quality	is	non-existent.	In	our	various	tests,	the	correlation	is	not	statistically	significant.	
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and for judges who make greater than the median salary.44 This comparison 
is made for (a) the different selection mechanisms for judges, (b) states 
where judges have less than or equal to the median tenure versus states with 
judges with greater than the median tenure,45 and (c) states with lifetime 
employment for judges versus states without lifetime employment.
 Greater compensation correlates with fewer citations for Election Parti-
san states. In contrast, greater compensation correlates with more citations 
for Election Non-Partisan, Merit, and Appointed judge states (although 
the difference for Election Non-Partisan judges is not significant). Simi-
larly, greater compensation does not correlate with a change in citations 
for judges with relatively shorter tenures; for judges with longer tenure, 
more pay correlates with more citations. Higher salary also correlates with 
increased citations for lifetime employment states (although not for non-
lifetime employment states). In sum, while greater salary correlates with 
higher quality opinions where judges face a lower retention risk, greater 
salary does not correlate with higher quality opinions where judges are at 
greater retention risk (and indeed, correlates in some instances with lower 
quality opinions). Maybe judges who face the risk of job loss focus their 
energies on the metrics of performance (number of opinions authored) 
that are easily observed by those deciding whether to hire or fire them (the 
populace, in an election state). Less observable measures, such as the qual-
ity of opinions are ignored — except by those who do not have to please 
the voters. This pattern is consistent with multitasking theory, which pre-
dicts that agents will exert effort with respect to measurable types of per-
formance and shirk with respect to other types of performance.
 To provide a multivariate test of the comparison tests of Table 6, we re-
place the Adjusted Associate Justice Salary variable with an indicator vari-
able for salaries greater than the median Adjusted Associate Justice Salary 
for our sample of fifty-two states (Big Salary). We also add interaction terms 
between the method of judge selection (Election Partisan, Election Non-
Partisan, and Merit) and Big Salary to Model 1 of Table 5. We similarly add 
44	We	use	the	median	adjusted	associate	salary	for	our	sample	of	fifty-two	states	measured	as	
of	1997	(equal	to	$103,410).	
45	We	use	the	median	tenure	of	justices	for	our	sample	of	fifty-two	states	measured	as	of	1997	
(equal	to	7.75	years).	
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Big Salary and interaction term between Big Salary and the Tenure variable 
to Model 2 of Table 5. Unreported, these additional multivariate tests pro-
vide similar qualitative results to those of our mean comparisons in Table 
6. Higher salary correlates with more outside state citations in Appointed, 
Election Non-Partisan, and Merit states (although the increase is significant 
only for Appointed and Election Non-Partisan states). In Partisan Election 
states, however, the effect of higher judicial salaries on the number of out-
side state citations is negative but not significantly different from zero. The 
relationship of salary with outside state citations per opinion varies with 
the particular judicial selection system. Where judges face more competi-
tion for their jobs (proxied by partisan elections), increased salary does not 
correlate with more citations per opinion. If anything, higher salary results 
in a low quality product. 
 We find in our multivariate test with the Tenure variable that high salary 
correlates with greater outside state citations. In contrast with our sum-
mary statistic comparison above, the coefficients on the Tenure variable 
and the interaction between Tenure and Big Salary are not significantly dif-
ferent from zero. In sum, employment conditions appear to matter in deter-
mining whether salary makes a difference in judicial quality—although the 
precise relationship between higher salaries and increase opinion quality is 
not straightforward (and may turn negative for certain regimes including 
in particular states where judges are elected and face retention pressure).
4.6. independence
We use a regression model to examine the relationship between our Inde-
pendence measure and the judicial salary and opportunity cost measures. 
The following equation on pooled data from 1998 to 2000 is estimated us-
ing an ordinary least squares model with standard errors clustered by state:
Independencei = α + ß1iAdj. Assoc. Justice Salary + ß2iAdj. Partner Salary
  + ß3iElection_Partisan + ß4iElection_Non-Partisan 
  + ß5iMerit_Plan + ß6iOpensecrets + ß7iNumber of Dissents
  + ∑ßjiSubject Matterji 
  + ∑ßkiCourt Characteristicski 
  + ∑ßliJudge Controlsli + ∑ßmiState Controlsmi 
  + Year Effects + ei
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Pooled versions of the Court Characteristic variables and Judge and State 
Controls are used in the model. As a control for subject matter composi-
tion of the pool, the number of majority opinions that deal with the subject 
matter divided by the number of majority opinions for the state in the 1998 
to 2000 time period is used. Two new variables are added. The first, Open-
secrets, is an indicator variable defined as 1 if the judge in question contrib-
uted money to a political candidate as tracked by the opensecrets.org website. 
Those who contribute their personal resources to the political campaigns of 
others are likely more partisan in their political beliefs. The second, number 
of dissents, is defined as the total number of dissents the judge in question 
authored during the 1998 to 2000 time period. Number of Dissents controls 
for the possibility that high levels of dissenting behavior might correlate with 
independence. We exclude judges from states where all judges in our sample 
were of the same political party from the analysis (Georgia, Maryland, New 
Mexico, South Carolina, South Dakota). The model is reported in Table 7 as 
Model 1; Model 2 reports the model with the substitution of average judge 
tenure (Tenure) instead of the judicial selection system variables (Election 
Partisan, Election Non-Partisan, and Merit Plan). 
 Table 7 does not support the view that higher salaries leads to more in-
dependent judges. In Models 1 and 2, the coefficient on judicial salary is 
insignificant. The opportunity cost measure in Models 1 and 2 (Adjusted 
Partner Salary) is significant and positive, suggesting that judges who give 
up more might be more independent. But the small coefficient suggests 
that the magnitude of the effect is not large.
 In terms of institutional design and other factors that might affect in-
dependence levels, we see that having a stable court has little impact on 
independence and that the presence of mandatory retirement does not re-
duce independence (if anything, increases it).46 Long-term clerks also again 
appear to produce no positive effects (if anything, negative effects).47 The 
number of clerks per judge does positively correlate with independence. 
46	Unreported	in	Table	7,	having	one’s	primary	prior	profession	in	the	private	sector	does	not	
correlate	with	higher	independence	either.	
47	As	a	robustness	test,	we	added	an	additional	indicator	variable	for	California	clerk	separate	from	
the	long-term	clerk	variable	(with	non-long-term	clerks	as	the	base	category).	The	coefficients	on	
long-term	clerk	and	California	clerk	were	both	negative	and	not	significantly	different	from	zero.	
The	coefficient	on	the	judicial	salary	variable	was	not	significantly	different	from	zero.
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 We re-estimate Model 1 using a logit model with the use of Indep01 as 
the dependent variable, defined to equal one if Independence is greater or 
equal to zero and zero otherwise. Indep01 is less vulnerable to the critique 
that the range of our Independence measure may vary based on the under-
lying political composition of a high court. In contrast, the Indep01 pro-
vides less information than our Independence measure, treating all judges 
with a positive or zero Independence score as the same (and likewise for 
all judges with a negative Independence score). Model 3 of Table 7 reports 
that with Indep01 as the dependent variable, judicial salary is not correlated 
with independence. We therefore find no evidence that higher salaries helps 
improve independence.48
 Table 8 compares the Independence score for judges who make less than or 
equal to the median salary and for judges who make greater than the median 
48	The	regression	models	in	Table	7	utilize	an	indicator	variable	for	whether	the	state	has	a	man-
datory	publication	rule	for	opinions	to	control	for	workload	differences	among	the	states.	We	
lack	data	for	these	variables	for	all	our	states.	As	a	robustness	test,	we	omit	the	Mandatory	
Publication	indicator	variable	from	the	Model	1	in	Table	7	and	re-estimate	the	model	instead	
with	the	addition	of	indicator	variables	for	whether	the	state	high	court	has	mandatory	juris-
diction	over	civil	(Mandatory	Civil	Jurisdiction)	or	criminal	(Mandatory	Criminal	Jurisdiction)	
cases.	Unfortunately,	we	lack	information	on	these	variables	for	all	of	our	states	and	only	use	
them	for	robustness	tests.	Unreported,	the	coefficient	on	associate	justice	salary	is	positive	
but	not	significantly	different	from	zero.	
	 	 We	also	re-estimate	Model	1	with	the	addition	of	an	indicator	variable	for	whether	the	
judge	also	teaches	as	an	adjunct	professor	(Professor).	Unreported,	the	model	produces	the	
same	qualitative	results	as	Model	1.	The	coefficient	on	judicial	salary	is	positive	but	not	sig-
nificantly	different	from	zero.	The	coefficient	on	Professor	is	negative	and	not	significant.	
	 	 We	re-estimate	Model	1	with	the	addition	of	an	indicator	variable	for	whether	the	judge	
comes	from	a	state	that	gives	 its	high	court	 judges	 lifetime	employment	(Lifetime).	Unre-
ported,	the	model	produces	the	same	qualitative	results	as	Model	1.	The	coefficient	on	judi-
cial	salary	is	positive	but	not	significantly	different	from	zero.	The	coefficient	on	Lifetime	is	
positive	and	significant	at	the	10	percent	level.	Some	evidence	exists	therefore	that	judges	
with	lifetime	employment	may	act	more	independently	of	party	affiliation.
	 	 We	re-estimate	Model	1	with	the	omission	of	the	number	of	dissents	variable.	While	our	
independence	measure	is	not	necessary	correlated	with	the	number	of	dissents,	the	construc-
tion	of	the	independence	variable	does,	in	part,	focus	on	the	number	of	opposite	party	dissents	
(in	 the	numerator)	and	 the	 total	number	of	dissents	 (in	 the	denominator).	Unreported,	 the	
coefficient	on	judicial	salary	is	again	negative	and	not	significantly	different	from	zero.
	 	 Lastly,	we	re-estimate	Model	1	with	the	addition	of	indicator	control	variables	for	whether	
the	state	is	a	member	of	U.S.	Census	region	Mid-West,	Northeast,	or	South	(using	West	as	the	
base	case).	Unreported,	the	coefficient	on	associate	justice	salary	is	positive	and	insignificant.	
	 	 Overall,	our	robustness	tests	reveal	that	the	higher	judicial	salaries	do	not	correlate	with	
increased	judicial	independence.	
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salary.49 This comparison is made for (a) the different selection mechanisms 
for judges, (b) states where judges have less than or equal to the median ten-
ure versus states with judges with greater than the median tenure,50 and (c) 
states with lifetime employment for judges versus states without lifetime em-
49	We	use	the	median	adjusted	associate	salary	for	our	sample	of	fifty-two	states	measured	as	
of	1997	(equal	to	$103,410).	
50	We	use	the	median	tenure	of	justices	for	our	sample	of	fifty-two	states	measured	as	of	1997	
(equal	to	7.75	years).	
table 7: independence
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
dependent variable Independence Independence Indep01
independent variables
Adjusted Associate Justice Salary 0.000 –0.001 –0.010
(–0.290) (–0.560) (–0.490)
Adjusted Partner Salary 0.002** 0.002** 0.020**
(3.580) (3.270) (3.340)
Election Partisan –0.060 –1.173
(–0.900) (-1.150)
Election Non-Partisan –0.165+ –3.215**
(–1.910) (-2.910)
Merit Plan –0.173* –3.558**
(–2.050) (-2.900)
Tenure –0.004
(–0.580)
Number of Dissents 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.300) (1.400) (0.080)
Opensecrets –0.046 –0.041 –0.596
(–1.370) (–1.230) (–1.220)
Stable Court 0.083 –0.009 2.414**
(1.010) (–0.100) (2.880)
Number of Active Judges 0.006 –0.010 0.420*
(0.380) (–0.480) (2.150)
No Mandatory Retirement –0.080+ –0.036 –0.659
(–1.760) (–0.770) (–1.100)
Long-Term Clerk –0.043 –0.059* 0.774**
(–1.340) (–2.110) (2.680)
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Number of Clerks Per Judge 0.080** 0.075** 0.251
(3.140) (3.170) (0.730)
Law Clerk Opportunity Cost –0.002+ 0.000 –0.071**
(–1.730) (–0.060) (–5.810)
ln(Trial Cases in the State) –0.072* –0.014 –0.835*
(–2.640) (–0.680) (–2.030)
Intermediate Appellate Court 0.049 –0.010 0.517
(0.810) (–0.180) (0.510)
Mandatory Publication 0.014 –0.066 2.493**
(0.240) (–1.190) (3.290)
Constant 3.035 2.352 93.040**
(1.200) (0.870) (3.000)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Judge Controls Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes
Subject Matter Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 324 324 309
Adj R2 0.1295 0.1220 0.1999
The	t-statistics	(in	parentheses)	are	calculated	using	standard	errors	clustered	by	state.	Variable	
definitions	are	in	the	Appendix.	The	logit	model	for	the	INDEP01	binary	dependent	variable	
reports	the	Pseudo	R2	instead	of	the	Adjusted	R2.
+	Coefficient	significant	at	the	10	percent	level	or	less.
*	Coefficient	significant	at	the	5	percent	level	or	less.
**	Coefficient	significant	at	less	than	the	1	percent	level.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
dependent variable Independence Independence Indep01
independent variables
ployment. As in Table 7, we exclude judges from states where all judges in our 
sample were of the same political party from the analysis. 
 Greater compensation does not generally correlate with a difference in 
independence levels for the different systems of selecting judges. Similarly, 
greater compensation does not correlate with independence regardless of a 
judge’s tenure. Higher salary does not correlate with greater independence 
for judges from non-lifetime or lifetime employment states. As a robustness 
check, we redo the mean comparisons in Table 8 using the INDEP01 binary 
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form of our independence measure. Unreported, we again find no differ-
ences in independence level.
 To provide a multivariate test of the mean comparison tests of Table 8, we 
replace the Adjusted Associate Justice Salary variable with an indicator vari-
able for salaries greater than the median Adjusted Associate Justice Salary (Big 
Salary). We also add interaction terms between the method of judge selection 
(Election Partisan, Election Non-Partisan, and Merit) and Big Salary to Model 
1 of Table 7. Unreported, Big Salary does not correlate with increased inde-
pendence in general or when interacted with the method of judge selection. 
We similarly add Big Salary and interaction terms between Big Salary and the 
Tenure variable to Model 2 of Table 7. Unreported, Big Salary does not correlate 
with increased independence in general or when interacted with Tenure.
table 8: independence summary statistics
Adj. Assoc. Justice 
salary less than or 
equal to Median
Adj. Assoc. Justice 
salary greater 
than Median
p-value
election partisan –0.002 –0.030 0.434
election non-partisan –0.029 –0.091 0.171
Merit –0.023 –0.034 0.723
Appointed –0.035 –0.018 0.784
tenure less than or 
equal to Median
–0.034 0.027 0.816
tenure greater than 
Median
–0.019 -0.055 0.190
not lifetime 
employment
-0.036 -0.043 0.742
lifetime employment 0.050 -0.038 0.234
In sum, the relationship of salary with our Independence measure does not 
vary with the particular judicial selection system. We also find no evidence 
that independence and salary are related depending on the amount of risk 
a judge faces in retaining her position (as reflected in the selection system 
and Tenure variables). 
4.7. Other Measures of Judicial Quality
We focus on productivity, opinion quality, and independence as measures of 
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judicial quality. Other ways to measure judicial quality are possible. One that 
has been suggested to us on multiple occasions at workshops is that the ranking 
of the law school which a judge attended may act as a proxy for the quality of 
the judge. Such a measure treats judges who graduated from a top law school as 
more capable than judges who graduate from lesser law schools; a plausible but 
questionable proposition. Nevertheless, we question whether higher salaries re-
sult in judges who graduated from higher ranked law schools.
 To test the relationship between higher ranked law schools and judicial 
salaries, we estimated a logit model using judge level data and an indica-
tor dependent variable for whether the judge graduated from a top ten law 
school as measured in the U.S. News Rankings for 2005 (Law School Rank-
ing). For independent variables, we use the pooled versions of the state, 
court, and judge controls used in the Independence model (see Table 7). 
Unreported, the coefficient on associate justice salary is negative but not 
significantly different from zero. 
 To assess whether higher salaries may have a differential effect depend-
ing on the method of judge selection, we re-estimate our logit Law School 
Ranking model, replacing the Adjusted Associate Justice Salary indepen-
dent variable with an indicator variable for salaries greater than the me-
dian Adjusted Associate Justice Salary (Big Salary). We also add interaction 
terms between the method of judge selection (Election Partisan, Election 
Non-Partisan, and Merit) and Big Salary. Unreported, we find that none of 
the Big Salary, the method of judge selection, and the interaction variables 
are significantly different from zero. 
5. cOnclusiOn
Our results defy easy description. By the same token they demonstrate that 
the debate about judicial salaries reflects an excessively simple picture of 
the judicial market.
 At the level of theory, the claim that increasing the salaries of judges will 
improve judicial output, while holding the other aspects of the judges’ po-
sition constant, has little support. Higher salaries should not improve the 
incentives of judges unless judges can be fired or otherwise punished for 
inadequate performance—which they often cannot. Higher salaries might 
increase the pool of people willing to be judges, but they also might encour-
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age people who lack a judicial temperament to enter that pool, and give politi-
cians better incentives to offer patronage rather than to appoint good judges. 
Further, it is a mistake to look at salaries in isolation from the other elements 
of judicial compensation—benefits, job security (for federal and some state 
judges), prestige, and power—and the general legal and political environment 
(type of selection system, political competition, caseload, assistance from clerks 
and staff). Comparisons of the salaries of judges and law firm associates are for 
this reason likely to be misleading. Finally, when high-quality people become 
judges, they must leave the private sector, vacating jobs where they may have a 
relatively high value compared with their value as judges. Judges should be paid 
their social value, and not more, but no one knows whether their social value is 
higher or lower than their current salary.
 The empirical results provide some support for salary advocates in those 
states where judges face a meaningful risk of termination, as theory would 
predict. But they do not provide much support in the area that has been the 
epicenter of the debate—the federal judiciary, where judges are appointed 
and have life tenure. If our empirical results carry over from the state courts 
to the federal judiciary, we would predict that increasing the salary of fed-
eral judges will not increase their productivity or independence. It might 
increase the quality of their opinions. The most plausible mechanism for 
this effect is that of selection: higher quality people would be willing to 
serve, and the appointment system, which involves both the president and 
the senate, screens out low-quality candidates (Lindstadt, Segal & Wester-
land 2006; but cf. Lott 2005). However, given the lack of robustness of our 
findings, such a conclusion is premature. 
 Thus, the case for increasing the salaries of federal judges is not particular-
ly strong. Even if increasing salary increases the quality of opinions, we would 
still need to know whether the social value of this extra quality is worth the 
price. Proponents of salary increases need to show that this is true. In addi-
tion, as we have seen, there may be better ways of improving the quality of 
judges—for example, by restricting judges to the use of short-term clerks. 
Or it might be better to have more low-paid judges than to have fewer highly 
paid judges. More work needs to be done before the relationship between sal-
ary and judicial quality is understood.
 We should acknowledge once again that our measures of judicial quality 
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are imperfect. Many aspects of judicial performance might be unobserv-
able or better captured with different variables. However, salary advocates 
who do not accept our measures should produce better measures. Other-
wise, there is just no evidence that justifies salary increases.
 In informal discussions, judges have advanced a number of criticisms 
of our argument. Some judges argue that our theory fails to capture the 
real reason why the failure to raise salaries will produce a diminishment of 
judicial productivity. They argue that judges fear that the credibility of the 
system and its legitimacy will be undermined if the majority of lawyers and 
even court administrators end up being paid more than the judges, who are 
supposed to be at the top of the hierarchy. Litigators and litigants will sim-
ply not respect judges who are not highly paid. Another argument we have 
heard is that Congress has breached its implicit contract with the judiciary 
to give it regular COLA raises, raises the federal judges did not receive for a 
long period in the 1990s and that afterwards only received intermittently in 
the form of “diet COLAs.” Pay has also not kept up with the increase in the 
case load, which has resulted in more work and worse working conditions. 
On the empirics, judges disagree with our measures of judicial produc-
tion. Alternate measures suggested include reversal rates, estimates of case 
backlogs, and appointments to high level judicial reform committees. One 
judge argued that judges who need to earn additional money might have to 
work as adjunct professors and that would take time away from their work 
as judges. We tested this proposition and found that there was indeed a 
negative correlation (albeit significant only at the 10 percent level) between 
quality and having taught as an adjunct.51 Testing the other hypotheses 
would require additional work, which would raise new theoretical and em-
pirical questions. We hope that we and other scholars will be able to address 
them in future research.
 A final point is that some scholars use judicial salary as a proxy for as-
pects of judicial quality in cross-national regressions (Feld & Voigt 2003). 
Our results show that in the United States the correlation between salary 
and judicial quality is not strong, and therefore suggest that the use of sal-
ary as a proxy for quality may be inadvisable.
51	 See	note	42.
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AppendiX 1
Key Variable Definitions
variable definition
Total Opinions Total number of majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions 
authored by a particular judge in one year (ranging from 1998 to 
2000).
Outside State Citations Total number of citations from (1) federal courts outside the federal 
circuit that includes the state in question and (2) courts in other 
states. Citations are measured in opinions authored up until Janu-
ary 1, 2007 (as tracked in the LEXIS Shepard’s database).
Opposite_Party The total number of opposing opinions written against an opposite 
party judge divided by the total number of opposing opinions writ-
ten against either a judge of the opposite or same party as the judge 
in question for the 1998 to 2000 time period. Opposing opinions 
include dissents written against a majority opinion and majority 
opinions where a dissenting opinion exists. 
Opposite_Pool Total number of majority opinions written by the high court judges 
of the opposite political party (from the perspective of the judge in 
question) divided by the total number of majority opinions written by 
judges of both the same and opposite parties from 1998 to 2000.
Independence Defined as Opposite_Pool minus Opposite_Party. A more negative 
Independence score occurs when Opposite_Pool < Opposite Par-
ty, indicating an increased tendency to write an opposing opinion 
against an opposite party judge. Conversely, a more positive Inde-
pendence score indicates a decreased tendency to write an oppos-
ing opinion against an opposite party judge.
Election Non-Partisan Indicator variable equal to 1 if the state uses a non-partisan election 
to select high court justices and 0 otherwise.
Election Partisan Indicator variable equal to 1 if the state uses a partisan election to 
select high court justices and 0 otherwise.
Merit Plan Indicator variable equal to 1 if the state follows the Missouri Merit 
Plan or a variant (including the Tennessee Plan) to select high 
court justices and 0 otherwise.
Tenure The average tenure of high court judges for the state in question, 
measured as of the spring of 1997 (from Hanssen 1999, Table 1).
Number of Dissents Indicator Variable equal to 1 if the judge authoring an opinion is Re-
publican and 0 otherwise.
West Key Pages Number of pages in an opinion associated with the West key pages 
section (as provided in the West reporter version of the opinion and 
tabulated on Westlaw).
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Opinion Length Number of pages from the start of the opinion to the end of the 
opinion as provided in the West reporter version of the opinion and 
tabulated on Westlaw. For majority opinions, we measured from 
where the authoring judge’s actual opinion starts to the end of the 
majority opinion.
Open Secrets Indicator Variable equal to 1 if the judge authoring the opinion in 
question has donated to a political candidate and 0 otherwise. 
Political contributions are tracked by www.opensecrets.org and in-
clude Federal Election Commission records of receipts from all indi-
viduals who contribute at least $200 from 1992 to 2006.
AppendiX 2
Judge-Level Variable Definitions
variable definition
Chief Judge For year-level data, indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge in ques-
tion is the chief judge of the court in the year in question and 0 
otherwise. For pooled data, indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge 
in question is the chief judge of the court for any year from 1998 to 
2000 and 0 otherwise. 
Court Experience For year-level data, the difference between the year in question and 
the year the judge first joined the high court. For pooled data, the 
difference between 1998 and the year the judge first joined the high 
court (if the judge started on the court in 1998 or later court experi-
ence is set to 0).
Post-Law School 
Experience
The difference between 1998 and the year the judge graduated law 
school.
Retirement Close Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge in question retired from the 
bench in 2001 or earlier and 0 otherwise.
Age Age of the judge in years.
Female Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge is female and 0 if male.
Private Practice Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge had private practice experi-
ence before becoming a judge and 0 otherwise.
Election Spending Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge raised funds relating to elec-
tion campaign expenditures for the current year and 0 otherwise.
PAJID Score PAJID score for each judge as developed by Brace, Hall & Langer 
(2001). These scores locate judges on a political continuum from 
highly conservative (0) to highly liberal (100).
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AppendiX 3 
Court-Level Variable Definitions
variable definition
Adjusted Associate 
Justice Salary
For year-level data, the associate justice salary reported in the prior 
year for the state (so 1997 for 1998 judge-level data) divided by a 
cost of living adjustment for the year in question measured for the 
metro area in which the high court of the state is located. For pooled 
data, the associate justice salary reported in 1997 divided by the 
cost of living adjustment for 1998 (in thousands of dollars).
Adjusted Partner Salary For year-level data, the average partner salary reported for the year 
in question for the state divided by a cost of living adjustment for 
the year in question measured for the metro area in which the high 
court of the state is located. For pooled data, the average partner 
salary in 1998 divided by the cost of living adjustment for 1998 (in 
thousands of dollars).
Stable Court Indicator variable equal to 1 if the state high court justices stayed 
the same from 1998 to 2000 and 0 otherwise.
Number of Active 
Judges on Bench
Number of judges who were active at any time from 1998 to 2000 
for the state in question.
No Mandatory 
Retirement
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judges on the state high court do 
not face mandatory retirement and 0 otherwise.
Long-Term Clerk Indicator variable equal to 1 if state clerks are tenured for more than 
one year and 0 if tenure is 1 year or less.
Number of Clerks 
Per Judge
Average number of clerks per judge in the 1998 to 2000 time 
period.
Law Clerk Opportunity 
Cost
The difference between the average salary of an entering associate 
at law firm in that state and the law clerk salary (in thousands of 
dollars). 
Number of Trial Cases 
in the State
Number of trial cases in the entire state in 1998 (in thousands).
Intermediate Appellate 
Court
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the opinion is in opposition to the opin-
ion of another judge in the same case and 0 otherwise. In the case of 
a dissenting opinion written by the judge in question, the opinion is 
treated as in active opposition to the majority opinion. In the case of 
a majority opinion by the judge in question, active opposition exists if 
the majority opinion is opposed by a dissenting opinion.
Mandatory Publication Indicator variable equal to 1 if judges on the state high court face a 
mandatory publication rule and 0 otherwise. 
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AppendiX 4 
State-Level Variable Definitions
variable definition
State Age Age of the state. For year-level data this is defined as the difference 
between the year in question and the year of admission of the 
state into the United States. For pooled data, this is defined as the 
difference between 1998 and the year of admission of the state into 
the United States.
State Population For year-level data, the population of the state in millions measured 
in the year prior to the year in question (so the population in 1997 if 
the data year is 1998). For pooled data, the population of the state 
in millions measured for 1997. 
Border Population Total population of all bordering states of the state in question 
(measured as of 1997 in millions).
Crime Index For year-level data, overall crime rate for the state (including prop-
erty and violent crime) per 100,000 people from the FBI Crime Re-
port for the year prior to the year in question. For pooled data, the 
overall crime rate measured for 1997. 
Gross State Product Gross State Product (measured as of 1998 in billion of dollars).
Median Age of 
Population
Median age of state population (2000 U.S. Census).
State Median Income Median per capita income of the state population (2000 U.S. Cen-
sus in thousands of dollars).
Black Population Fraction Fraction of the population comprised of blacks as obtained from the 
2000 Census.
Citizen Ideology Score Measure of citizen ideology based on election results in each dis-
trict, which are then used to compute a statewide average (ulti-
mately based on interest group ratings of a given state’s federal 
congressional delegation) (from Berry, Ringquist & Hanson 1998).
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AppendiX 4 (continued)
Subject Matter Categories
variable definition
Administrative Review of Agency/Government Decision-making (not in another 
subject matter category). Also includes Government Actions (e.g., 
State suit to comply with state statute that does not fit in other 
categories); private actions suing state actors for negligence, etc. 
(unless the case involves prisoner rights which is included in the 
“Criminal” category of cases). 
Attorney and Client Attorney Misconduct; Attorney fees (unless fits in one of above cat-
egories); Disbarment; Contempt of court order against attorney.
Capital Punishment Capital Punishment-related actions.
Church and State Pledge of Allegiance; Funding for Private Religious Schools; Prayer 
in School; Ten Commandments.
Commercial Contracts; Insurance; Private arbitration; Creditor v. Debtor; 
Lessor-Lessee; Usury Laws; Franchise v. Franchisor; Employment 
Contractual Disputes; Corporate Law; Piercing the Corporate Veil; 
Tax; Bankruptcy; Enforcement of mechanics lien; Implied warrant of 
merchantability.
Criminal Sentencing Guidelines; Prisoners' Rights; Murder; Rape; Drugs/
Controlled Substances; Attorney-Client Privilege in Criminal Con-
text; Grand Jury-related; Juvenile Criminals. Excludes Capital Pun-
ishment cases.
Family Divorce; Adoption; Child Support; Probate/Inheritance.
First Amendment Employment issues (excluding employment contractual disputes); 
ERISA; National Labor Relations Board (NLRB); Occupational Safety 
and Health Act (OSHA); Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); Wrong-
ful Discharge; Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA); Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA); Employee Benefits; Worker’s Com-
pensation claims; Retaliatory Discharge claims.
Labor Employment issues (excluding (1) employment contractual dis-
putes that are not Worker's Comp or state administrative wage 
rate related—these go to “Commercial” and (2) excluding discrim-
ination-type claims that fit in “Civil Rights”); ERISA; NLRB; Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act (OSHA); Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA); Wrongful Discharge; Labor Management Relations Act 
(LMRA); Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA); Employee Ben-
efits; Worker’s Compensation claims; Retaliatory Discharge claims; 
State Wage Rate Claims.
Property Takings claims; Zoning issues; Property rights; Property Licensing-
Related or Permit-Related; Landlord-Tenant-Related.
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Rights Race Discrimination; Sex Discrimination; Affirmative Action; Civil 
Rights; Age Discrimination; Privacy; Handicap Discrimination; 
Abortion (includes discrimination in employment context cases); 
Voting Rights-Voting Related.
Torts Federal Tort Related Act; Medical Malpractice; Products Liability; 
Wrongful Death; Libel; etc.
Other All other cases.
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table 5: Quality
Model 1 Model 2
dependent variable ln(1+Outside Citations) ln(1+Outside Citations)
independent variables
Adjusted Associate Justice  Salary 0.001 0.000 
(1.430) (0.630)
Adjusted Partner Salary 0.000 0.000 
(0.180) (–0.610)
Election Partisan –0.036 
(–1.410)
Election Non-Partisan 0.008 
(0.350)
Merit Plan –0.058* 
(–2.330)
Tenure 0.000 
(–0.160)
Stable Court –0.050** –0.039*
(–2.890) (–2.200)
Number of Active Judges –0.021** –0.017** 
(–4.210) (–3.080)
No Mandatory Retirement –0.002 0.001 
(–0.120) (0.040)
Long-Term Clerk –0.086** –0.081** 
(–5.460) (–5.140)
Number of Clerks Per Judge –0.011 –0.010 
(–0.910) (–0.790)
Law Clerk Opportunity Cost 0.003** 0.002** 
(5.320) (4.710)
ln(Trial Cases in the State) –0.000 0.000 
(–0.000) (0.040)
Intermediate Appellate Court 0.020 –0.017 
(0.720) (–0.620)
Mandatory Publication –0.014 –0.015 
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(–0.880) (–0.840)
Constant –6.469** –5.787** 
(–6.670) (–6.430)
The	t-statistics	(in	parentheses)	are	calculated	using	standard	errors	clustered	by	judge.	Variable	
definitions	are	in	the	Appendix.
+	Coefficient	significant	at	the	10	percent	level	or	less.
*	Coefficient	significant	at	the	5	percent	level	or	less.
**	Coefficient	significant	at	less	than	the	1	percent	level.
